Real Estate Crash thread

[skier666]

Really? Conditioning people to expect that irresponsible risky behavior won't bear consequences is better in the long run? No, it's "better" in the short run and that's why it will happen.

Agreed, its a tough situation. After I wrote that I began to think about people with credit card debt. Should they get a brake too? And of course, the loans have been packaged into securities, so I doubt they could be changed even if the bank wanted to.

[4matic]

Because a home is different than a credit card. Why not car loans? Student Loans? Or any other loan.. Because it's not.

Bad home loans are perceived to affect a wider scope of the economy and blighten neighborhoods causing further errosion in equity. The plan supposedly will help firm up prices too. Not agreeing or disagreeing just commenting. The thought is that if govt can bail banks out of this mess they can bail out individuals.

My .02 is that benefactors should give up an equity stake.

[mcsquared]

Real estate related stocks jump huge today. KB home up 15%. XHB up almost 11%. Does this mean anything?

Discuss.

[Toadman]

Real estate related stocks jump huge today. KB home up 15%. XHB up almost 11%. Does this mean anything?

Discuss.

It's just the short term euphoria and uneducated trying to make a quick buck. It's not like there is all of a sudden too little housing supply out there because a bunch of people neck deep in mortgage payments suddenly get to keep their houses. The way I understand the teaser freeze, is that only about 1/3 of homeowners will qualify. Still too soon to tell if this proposal will have any appreciable effect on the housing market. My guess is it's a band-aid where a tourniquet is needed. Still it might save Christmas for a few.

[Benny Profane]

Housing Prices to Drop 30% before Slump Ends: Report

http://www.cnbc.com/id/22125224

"While activity will stabilize in 2009, it will not be until 2010 before a measurable improvement in sales, construction and pricing will emerge, the report said."

[mcsquared]

Housing Prices to Drop 30% before Slump Ends: Report

http://www.cnbc.com/id/22125224

"While activity will stabilize in 2009, it will not be until 2010 before a measurable improvement in sales, construction and pricing will emerge, the report said."

But only in Punta Gorda, Fl and Stockton, CA. And frankly if you live in a town called Punta Gorda you have already given up.

[Hugh Conway]

But only in Punta Gorda, Fl and Stockton, CA. And frankly if you live in a town called Punta Gorda you have already given up.

5-15% won't bother you?

[Benny Profane]

NYT

December 26, 2007
OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
Frozen Rates, Falling Prices

By PETER SCHIFF
Darien, Conn.

THE Bush administration’s mortgage rescue plan will worsen, not alleviate, the problems in the housing market.

We are suffering from a home value crisis, not simply a credit crisis. If home prices were still rising, defaults would be low, investment returns would be high, borrowers would still be cashing out equity, and lenders would be showering credit on home buyers.

Falling prices reverse this dynamic. A recent study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston found that most foreclosures result from falling home prices, not from the resetting of mortgage rates.

And if rates are frozen for some subprime mortgages, standards for most new loans will become increasingly strict. Lenders will have to factor in the added risk of having their contracts rewritten when borrowers default. Higher down payments, mortgage rates and required credit scores — along with lower loan-to-income ratios and perhaps the death of adjustable-rate loans altogether — will further push down home prices.

Whether or not their payment levels are frozen, borrowers with loans that are greater than the values of their homes will have few incentives to keep paying their mortgages or to maintain their properties. Why spend more on a home in which they have no equity and which they may lose to foreclosure anyway?

Having put nothing down or having extracted equity in previous refinances, most subprime borrowers will lose nothing financially from foreclosure. In some cases the low teaser rates allowed them to pay less than what they might otherwise have paid in rent. The real losses are borne by the lenders.

Proponents suggest that a rate freeze will buttress home prices by keeping foreclosed homes off the market. But that is a stay of execution, not a pardon. Most homes temporarily saved from foreclosure will continue to depreciate as new buyers fail to qualify for loans. Lenders will be on the hook for even more losses than if the foreclosures had taken place sooner.

Everyone seems to agree that a return to traditional lending standards is a good idea, but no one seems willing to accept a return to rational prices as a consequence.

While the bubble was inflating, self-serving explanations were offered for why traditional formulas of home valuation no longer applied. As it turns out, the laws are still in effect. These traditional measures, like the relationship between home prices, rents and income, indicate that prices need to fall at least 30 percent more nationally. The sooner this balance is achieved, the sooner lenders will again commit capital.

Peter Schiff is the president of a Connecticut-based brokerage company and the author of “Crash Proof: How to Profit From the Coming Economic Collapse.”

[timvwcom]

Hold on tight ladies... I also see (Edit; maybe read "feel" here?) signs this could be bumpy for a couple years?

[char]

So now isn't a good time to buy anywhere? Or does it depend on the market?

[meatdrink9]

I'm still buying. I have one place under contract and another offer out there I'm waiting to hear back on, but I'm playing a very different game. I'm buying houses from banks for next to nothing (recently bought two houses for 54K together), fixing them up and renting them for substantial cash flow. It's a very good time to be a buyer if you're strong financially. I'm buying in an incredibly undervalued market and I'm still buying well below it's current value to play it safe. My niche is homes for 50-60K with a cost per square foot well below $50. Most homes sizes are 1,500 - 2,000 sq ft.

But all of this is very real. I'm sure my McMansion would be virtually impossible to sell right now and will lose value over the next couple of years, but luckily I got it for a steal as well.

[timvwcom]

So now isn't a good time to buy anywhere? Or does it depend on the market?

As you can see MD9 saying... If you find a good deal and can arrange financing, it can be a FANTASTIC time to buy; providing you won't need to resell it within a few years. The issue is the selling side right now, with those NEEDING to get out having to absorb a loss if they have equity, or worse if they don't.

[skier666]

So many articles on this....nothing very optomisticL


The finger of suspicion

Dec 19th 2007 | NEW YORK
From The Economist print edition

In America and elsewhere trial lawyers, state prosecutors and regulators look for the crime in subprime

FINANCIAL firms have already been drenched by mortgage-related losses. Now a wave of litigation threatens to assail them. According to RiskMetrics, a consulting firm, between August and October federal securities class-action lawsuits were filed in America at an annualised pace of around 270—more than double last year's total and well above the historical average. At this rate, claims could easily exceed those of the dotcom bust and options-backdating scandal combined.

At most risk are banks that peddled mortgages or mortgage-backed securities. Investors have handed several writs to Citigroup and Merrill Lynch. Bear Stearns has received dozens over the collapse of two leveraged hedge funds. A typical complaint accuses it of failing to make adequate reserves or to explain the risks of its subprime investments, and of dubious related-party transactions with the funds. Several firms, including E*Trade, a discount broker with a banking arm sitting on a radioactive pile of mortgage debt, are being sued for allegedly failing to disclose problems as they became apparent to managers.

But one thing that sets the subprime litigation wave apart from that of the 2001-03 bear market is its breadth. After the collapses of Enron and WorldCom, lawsuits were targeted at a fairly narrow range of parties: bust internet firms, their accountants and some banks. This time, investors are aiming not only at mortgage lenders, brokers and investment banks but also insurers (American International Group), bond funds (State Street, Morgan Keegan), rating agencies (Moody's and Standard & Poor's) and homebuilders (Beazer Homes, Toll Brothers et al).

Borrowers, too, are suing both their lenders and the Wall Street firms that wrapped up their loans. Several groups of employees and pension-fund participants have filed so-called ERISA/401(k) suits against their own firms. Local councils in Australia are threatening to sue a subsidiary of Lehman Brothers over the sale of collateralised-debt obligations ( CDOs), the Financial Times has reported. Lenders are even turning on each other; Deutsche Bank has filed large numbers of lawsuits against mortgage firms, claiming they owe money for failing to buy back loans that soured within months of being made.

"It seems that everyone is suing everyone," says Adam Savett of RiskMetrics' securities-litigation group. "It surely can't be long before we get the legal equivalent of man bites dog, where a lender sues its borrowers for some breach of contract."

The authorities, too, are baring their teeth. Several Wall Street banks have received subpoenas from New York's attorney-general, Andrew Cuomo, requesting information on their packaging of now-stricken securities. This comes on top of a deepening probe into possibly inflated home-price appraisals by brokers and lenders, including Washington Mutual and First American Corporation. Ohio's attorney-general, Marc Dann, has been just as hyperactive, suing over a dozen lenders and brokers.

No less important is the spadework being done by the Securities and Exchange Commission, America's main markets watchdog. It is conducting more than 20 investigations, including one into the arrangements banks entered into with hedge funds that may have been designed to hide or delay mark-to-market losses.

Such probes are even more important than they appear because they could encourage private litigation. Regulators and state prosecutors have more powers to demand information than private plaintiffs do. What they unearth, if they go public with it, can bolster investors' claims or even lead to new ones. This is what happened following congressional investigations into the tobacco industry, and when Eliot Spitzer, Mr Cuomo's predecessor (and now New York's governor), went looking for smoking guns at banks, insurers and mutual-fund managers after the 2001 stockmarket fall. The officials are likely to dig even harder this time since the issue touches poor homeowners, a more vulnerable group than day-traders.

In readiness, law firms have been rushing to set up dedicated subprime practices. These are working not only on disputes but also on helping clients to unwind leveraged transactions. "Securitisation is the particle physics of finance, which makes it much richer legally than technology stocks," says John Rosenthal, head of Nixon Peabody's subprime team.

That complexity is a mixed blessing for plaintiffs. Showing that financial innovation got out of hand will not be hard. However, they have to prove not only incompetence, but fraud. Defendants will argue that, far from deceiving investors, they failed to understand the structured products they had bought (or created) and the speed with which those securities could deteriorate in value—in other words, that they were clueless but not conniving.

Banks that face lawsuits over mortgage debt they peddled have at least one strong argument in their favour: they themselves bought the stuff. Both Citi and Merrill, for instance, held on to the senior tranches of CDOs, which have since gone bad. Would they have done this knowing that the securities were potentially so toxic? On the other hand, plaintiffs' lawyers say there are plenty of examples from recent months of banks and companies that have run aground even after stating in calls with investors that they had safeguards in place.

As busy as the lawyers are, they are only warming up. Scrutiny of the way banks account for tainted securities is just beginning, as is the task of poring through e-mails provided under subpoena. And as pain spreads to other securitised products, such as car and credit-card loans, they too will come under the spotlight.

The ultimate cost of the mortgage crisis in terms of settlements, awards and legal fees can only be guessed at. But the consensus view is that payouts will climb well above the billions stemming from the internet bubble.

Now, as then, many will settle for large sums rather than risk lengthy court proceedings that could end in even bigger payouts, even if their defences have some merit. And it is not just those directly involved who will suffer. On one estimate, from Guy Carpenter, a reinsurance broker, insurers that underwrite directors and executives could end up shelling out more than $3 billion. For the plaintiffs' bar, at least, the next boom is already at hand.

[Tourette Dude]

A chain reaction that is LTCM times a thousand. Its going to be interesting to say the least.



In "Crisis May Make 1929 Look a 'Walk in the Park'," the Daily Telegraph suggests that circumstances may well be unfolding in dangerously textbook fashion.

As central banks continue to splash their cash over the system, so far to little effect, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard argues things are rapidly spiralling out of their control

Twenty billion dollars here, $20bn there, and a lush half-trillion from the European Central Bank at give-away rates for Christmas. Buckets of liquidity are being splashed over the North Atlantic banking system, so far with meagre or fleeting effects.

As the credit paralysis stretches through its fifth month, a chorus of economists has begun to warn that the world's central banks are fighting the wrong war, and perhaps risk a policy error of epochal proportions.

"Liquidity doesn't do anything in this situation," says Anna Schwartz, the doyenne of US monetarism and life-time student (with Milton Friedman) of the Great Depression.

"It cannot deal with the underlying fear that lots of firms are going bankrupt. The banks and the hedge funds have not fully acknowledged who is in trouble. That is the critical issue," she adds.

Lenders are hoarding the cash, shunning peers as if all were sub-prime lepers. Spreads on three-month Euribor and Libor - the interbank rates used to price contracts and Club Med mortgages - are stuck at 80 basis points even after the latest blitz. The monetary screw has tightened by default.

York professor Peter Spencer, chief economist for the ITEM Club, says the global authorities have just weeks to get this right, or trigger disaster.

"The central banks are rapidly losing control. By not cutting interest rates nearly far enough or fast enough, they are allowing the money markets to dictate policy. We are long past worrying about moral hazard," he says.

"They still have another couple of months before this starts imploding. Things are very unstable and can move incredibly fast. I don't think the central banks are going to make a major policy error, but if they do, this could make 1929 look like a walk in the park," he adds.

The Bank of England knows the risk. Markets director Paul Tucker says the crisis has moved beyond the collapse of mortgage securities, and is now eating into the bedrock of banking capital. "We must try to avoid the vicious circle in which tighter liquidity conditions, lower asset values, impaired capital resources, reduced credit supply, and slower aggregate demand feed back on each other," he says.

New York's Federal Reserve chief Tim Geithner echoed the words, warning of an "adverse self-reinforcing dynamic", banker-speak for a downward spiral. The Fed has broken decades of practice by inviting all US depositary banks to its lending window, bringing dodgy mortgage securities as collateral.

Quietly, insiders are perusing an obscure paper by Fed staffers David Small and Jim Clouse. It explores what can be done under the Federal Reserve Act when all else fails.

Section 13 (3) allows the Fed to take emergency action when banks become "unwilling or very reluctant to provide credit". A vote by five governors can - in "exigent circumstances" - authorise the bank to lend money to anybody, and take upon itself the credit risk. This clause has not been evoked since the Slump.

Yet still the central banks shrink from seriously grasping the rate-cut nettle. Understandably so. They are caught between the Scylla of the debt crunch and the Charybdis of inflation. It is not yet certain which is the more powerful force.

America's headline CPI screamed to 4.3 per cent in November. This may be a rogue figure, the tail effects of an oil, commodity, and food price spike. If so, the Fed missed its chance months ago to prepare the markets for such a case. It is now stymied.

This has eerie echoes of Japan in late-1990, when inflation rose to 4 per cent on a mini price-surge across Asia. As the Bank of Japan fretted about an inflation scare, the country's financial system tipped into the abyss.

In theory, Japan had ample ammo to fight a bust. Interest rates were 6 per cent in February 1990. In reality, the country was engulfed by the tsunami of debt deflation quicker than the bank dared to cut rates. In the end, rates fell to zero. Still it was not enough.

When a credit system implodes, it can feed on itself with lightning speed. Current rates in America (4.25 per cent), Britain (5.5 per cent), and the eurozone (4 per cent) have scope to fall a long way, but this may prove less of a panacea than often assumed. The risk is a Japanese denouement across the Anglo-Saxon world and half Europe.

Bernard Connolly, global strategist at Banque AIG, said the Fed and allies had scripted a Greek tragedy by under-pricing credit long ago and seem paralysed as post-bubble chickens now come home to roost. "The central banks are trying to dissociate financial problems from the real economy. They are pushing the world nearer and nearer to the edge of depression. We hope they will eventually be dragged kicking and screaming to do enough, but time is running out," he said.........



http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/mai...123.xml&page=1

[Toadman]

Well it sure would suck if the U.S. economy spent a decade in a 1990's era Japanese economic downturn/stagnation. The oracle of Omaha seems to think all the negativity is over-hyped, and that the economy isn't going to go into recession. I guess if you've got a few hundred billion invested, you wouldn't want to jump on the recession bandwagon.

[timvwcom]

Cal-I-forni-a... also needing a wrecker.

http://www.businessweek.com/ap/finan.../D8UB48M81.htm

California defaults soar in 4Q

By ALEX VEIGA

LOS ANGELES

The number of California homeowners who fell behind on their mortgage payments surged in the fourth quarter of 2007 to a 15-year high, heightening the possibility of a jump in foreclosures, a real estate research firm said Tuesday.

A total of 81,550 default notices were sent to homeowners statewide between October and December, up 12.4 percent from the previous quarter and an increase of more than 114 percent versus the same quarter in 2006, according to DataQuick Information Systems.

Last quarter's tally of default notices is the highest recorded by DataQuick, whose records go back to 1992.

The notices serve as an early indicator of possible foreclosures.

In addition, 31,676 homes ended up in foreclosure during the quarter, up 30.8 percent since the third quarter and a 421.2 percent jump from 6,078 foreclosures in the prior-year period, the firm said.

The tally of foreclosures in the most recent quarter was the highest number recorded by DataQuick since it began keeping those figures in 1988.

Mortgage defaults have been on the rise statewide since fall 2005, coinciding with the start of a slowdown in sales and lagging home appreciation.

When home appreciation slows, it makes it harder for homeowners who fall behind on payments to sell their homes and clear the debt.

Most of the home loans that slipped into default during the fourth quarter of 2007 were made between August 2005 and October 2006, the final months of the housing boom.

The median age of home loans in default increased to 22 months from 15 months in the fourth quarter of 2006.

The change suggests sagging home values are eating away at equity, placing more home loans at risk of foreclosure, the firm said.

"We think depreciation is the main culprit," said Andrew LePage, a DataQuick analyst.

The median home price in California peaked at $484,000 last March but had slipped to $402,000 by the end of the year as the housing boom went bust.

The median amount of the primary home loans in default was $340,000; the median amount homeowners fell behind was $11,121, the firm said.

Borrowers who took out home equity loans owed a median of $3,379.

[Benny Profane]

Hey, Timv, watch your back. Someone like this bitch may be after you....

NYT

January 22, 2008
Feeling Misled on Home Price, Buyers Sue Agent

By DAVID STREITFELD
CARLSBAD, Calif. — Marty Ummel feels she paid too much for her house. So do millions of other people who bought at the peak of the housing boom.

What makes Ms. Ummel different is that she is suing her agent, saying it was all his fault.

Ms. Ummel claims that the agent hid the information that similar homes in the neighborhood were selling for less because he feared she would back out and he would lose his $30,000 commission.

Real estate lawyers and brokers say the case, which goes to trial in North County Superior Court on Monday, is likely to be the first of many in which regretful or resentful buyers seek redress from the agents who found them a home and arranged its purchase.

“When your house appreciates $100,000 in the first six months, you’re not quite as concerned that maybe the valuation was $25,000 or $50,000 off,” said Clifford Horner of the law firm Horner & Singer. “But when your house goes down, you ask: ‘Who might have led me astray here?’ ”

Agents representing buyers rarely had the opportunity to make mistakes during the last real estate boom, in the late 1980s, because the job hardly existed then. For decades, residential transactions almost always involved brokers who, whatever assistance they gave the buyer, legally represented only the seller.

The long boom that began in the late 1990s put an end to that one-sided world. As prices spiked, buyer’s agents and brokers became popular as sounding boards, advisers and negotiators. The National Association of Realtors estimates they are now involved in two-thirds of all residential purchases.

That makes this the first housing collapse in which large numbers of buyers had a real estate professional explicitly looking after their interests. The Ummel case poses the question: In a relationship built on trust, where promises are rarely written down and where — as in this case — there is no signed contract, what are the exact obligations of these representatives in guiding their clients through a sizzling market?

“Agents have a lot of fiduciary duties, but they don’t make money unless they close the sale,” said Joel Ruben, a real estate lawyer in Manhattan Beach, Calif. “In an inflated market, there are built-in temptations to cut corners.”

The defendant in the Ummel case is Mike Little, a veteran agent with ReMax Associates. He will argue that Marty Ummel, who brought the case with her husband, Vernon, is trying to shift the blame for the couple’s own failures of research and due diligence.

“They simply didn’t do what is expected of a knowledgeable, sophisticated buyer, and are now looking for someone other than themselves to take responsibility,” Roger Holtsclaw, an agent who was hired by Mr. Little as an expert witness, said in a court deposition.

Ms. Ummel is 60; Mr. Ummel, 71. With retirement on the horizon, they decided in late 2004 to move from the San Francisco Bay area to San Diego, where they would be near their grown children.

Since they were not making the move for job reasons, they decided to take their time and focus on finding a house that was a good value. In a boom, that is no simple task for buyer or agent.

It is clear the Ummels did not rush into a decision: They dismissed one agent and canceled deals on two houses before Mr. Little found them a prospect on a cul-de-sac in a five-year-old luxury development. A deal was struck with the owner, herself a real estate agent, for $1.2 million.

Mr. Little also worked as a mortgage broker. The Ummels say he encouraged them to get their loan through him. Mr. Little ordered an appraisal of the house but did not respond to the couple’s requests to see it, the suit charges.

A few days after the couple moved in, in August 2005, they got a flier on their door from another realty agent. It showed a house up the street had just sold for $105,000 less than theirs, even though it was the same size.

Then they finally got their appraisal, which told them the house up the street was not only cheaper but had a pool. Another flier in early October mentioned a house down the street that was the same size and closed the same day as the Ummels’ but went for $175,000 less.

The Ummels accuse Mr. Little not only of withholding information but of exaggerating the virtues of their house to push them into a deal.

Ms. Ummel said in her deposition that Mr. Little had told them “many times that it was a very good buy.”

“And you believed that?” asked David Bright, the lawyer who represents both Mr. Little and ReMax Associates, which was also named in the suit.

“Yes, we trusted Mike Little,” Ms. Ummel replied.

Mr. Horner, the lawyer, said valuation is a tricky area for brokers.

“Brokers aren’t appraisers,” said Mr. Horner, one of the writers of a guide to suing brokers. “They have no obligation to opine about value. But once they do, it becomes a gray area whether it’s puffery or a misstatement of a known fact.”

Most people who made a bad real estate deal might wince and move on, but people who know Ms. Ummel describe her as unusually determined. She spent a year picketing ReMax offices on weekends.

Mr. Ummel, an administrator at Dominican University, gave her his permission to pursue the case, on one condition: “Don’t tell me how much the legal fees are.” So far, the bills come to $75,000, more than Ms. Ummel’s annual salary as a fund-raiser at California State University in San Marcos.

“I do not think I’m obsessive-compulsive, but I am 114 pounds of absolute perseverance,” Ms. Ummel said.

That persistence has put the Ummels at the forefront of a developing legal question. When buyers have sued their agents in the past, the cases focused on problems with the property itself, often alleging failure by the broker to disclose a known hazard or maintenance issue. After reviewing litigation records for the last five years, the National Association of Realtors could find no cases that revolved solely around the question of valuation.

Ms. Ummel’s original suit included the appraiser, who was accused of skewing his report to make the Ummel’s house seem worth the purchase price, and the mortgage broker. Modest settlements have been reached with both.

In a brief phone interview, Mr. Little called the case “ridiculous,” adding: “The lady’s a nut job. I didn’t do anything wrong.”

Mr. Little said that contrary to Ms. Ummel’s claims, the suit was motivated mainly by the declining market. “When people see their home values and assets declining, they always feel there’s someone to blame,” he said. “This is a dangerous time for all of us in the industry.”

The agent declined several requests to expand on his remarks. His lawyer declined to be interviewed. So did Geoff Mountain, a co-owner of ReMax Associates, which owns the office that the Ummels were dealing with.

Both sides have hired appraisers who have combed the surrounding development. Mr. Little’s appraiser concluded the four-bedroom, 3.5-bath house was worth $1,150,000 to $1.2 million in the summer of 2005. The Ummels’ appraiser said it was worth $1,050,000.

The outlines of Mr. Little’s defense can be seen in his lawyer’s lengthy deposition of the Ummels. Even in a relatively new development, Mr. Bright said, no two houses and no two deals can be seen as identical. For instance, a pool does not necessarily add value because “some buyers like it, some don’t.”

Mr. Little never showed the Ummels the house down the street because the backyard could be viewed from other houses, the lawyer said, and the couple had said they valued their privacy. Ms. Ummel disputes saying this.

The agent who left the flier that led to the case, Margaret Hokkanen, is sympathetic to Mr. Little.

“People are responsible for their own decisions,” said Ms. Hokkanen, who has been subpoenaed as a defense witness.

Her husband and partner, John Hokkanen, is more ambivalent.

“We have seen so much misrepresentation over the last five years,” he said. “So I appreciate where these buyers might be coming from: ‘I’m a lowly consumer, you’re certified by the state of California, you didn’t do X, you didn’t do Y, and I got hurt.’ ”

The Ummels may be on the leading edge of the law, but they are unlikely to be alone for long. With the market falling, many homeowners owe more on their mortgages than their houses are worth. And many of those deals involved brokers who are required to carry professional liability insurance, presenting a tempting target for angry buyers.

“If you put someone into a property at the top of the market, you look really bad if it goes down,” said K. P. Dean Harper, a real estate lawyer in Walnut Creek, Calif. “There are a lot of letters going out from lawyers to real estate agents saying, ‘My client would never have purchased if you had properly evaluated the market conditions and the value of the property.’ ”

[comish]

This lawsuit is almost like suing a ski area because you tweaked your knee!

Be responsible for your own decision on what to pay for the fricken house!?!?

[Hugh Conway]

This lawsuit is almost like suing a ski area because you tweaked your knee!

Be responsible for your own decision on what to pay for the fricken house!?!?

No, it's not.

Many people hire a realtors to provide them insight into the process, local knowledge. Why? Because many people don't buy and sell properties every year. Frankly thats where realtors can add value because any schmuck can get a license and access to the MLS.

[Benny Profane]

Yeah, well, it's all about the fucking lawyers. I was party to a class action lawsuit involving a VERY substantial loss of retirement savings when a former employer decided to partake in one of the worst mergers in history during the dot com bullshit. Lies were told, numbers were faked, but nobody went to jail, and some are now richer than kings. But BP waits almost 5 years to find out he was awarded maybe 3 percent of what he lost to these cocksuckers. And that little sum was just wiped out in the last week of stock market turmoil. Me, cynical? nahhhhh.

[rideit]

You all should invest in Teton Springs, like, seriel, YO!

[Benny Profane]

You all should invest in Teton Springs, like, seriel, YO!

Is that shit still selling? Have things slowed down over the pass?

[rideit]

Read between the lines, brah'...the distinct LACK of sales for Teton Springs/River Rim/ Huntsman Springs is a decided UPTURN for market conditions in this lil' valle'.... (As in, the less geese killing the Golden Goose, the better....)

[timvwcom]

Hey, Timv, watch your back. Someone like this bitch may be after you....

Yeah, I saw that at NYT... That certainly is one extra issue in a down market. I can see two sides in that story;

On the agent; without lots more info on agency specifics and his actions in this case, hard to know what he did right/wrong on the Real Estate side. Guessing if he has liability here it's the "also their Mortgage Broker" issue added in that might trip him up?

On her, I catch these comments;
-It is clear the Ummels did not rush into a decision: They dismissed one agent and canceled deals on two houses before Mr. Little found them a prospect.
-but people who know Ms. Ummel describe her as unusually determined. She spent a year picketing ReMax offices on weekends.
-So far, the bills come to $75,000, more than Ms. Ummel’s annual salary as a fund-raiser at California State University in San Marcos.
Ahhh... yeah, probably a nut job! But she could have a valid point anyway? Without more details impossible to know.

I'm not worried though... My clients and customers carry me around on a throne they're so happy! I also use an atypical house hunting process; I get buyers specific wants/needs then print out/email just everything that meets those criteria. For those in a hurry, especially transferees, I usually devote the entire first day to just "drive bys"... most rule out 75 to 80+ percent from the curb based on community, location, curb appeal, etc. Then we go see what's left inside over the next couple days... Result: buyer sez "Duh, THAT is the best one for me, let's go write an offer!" Believe me? ( Man, that's a bad photo... I've got to get it redone!)

(Edit: Just found that SquawMan posted up the same damn CA foreclosures article in the stock crash thread, how'd I miss that? Even added emphasis to same paragraph. http://www.tetongravity.com/forums/s...&postcount=363)

[enlosandes]

Ms Ummel needs to take responsibility for her actions instead of blaming it own her realtor. Buying Real Estate is a risk, and the buyer needs to do their homework. IMO, it is kind of similar to all these sub primers who bought with the teaser rate and now can't make their payments. Now the government and our tax dollars are going to bail them out.