SUMMIT FEVER
Please read this TR first.
I'm writing this because I want to become a safer backcountry skier. An avalanche expert, Ian McCammon, wrote a very influential article on what he calls heuristic traps. The paper is here fyi - www.snowpit.com/articles/traps%20reprint.pdf. A good article on it is also here http://www.sltrib.com/portlet/articl...rticle=2476931
"Heuristic traps" is basically one way of describing a particualar mindset that a skier or backcountry traveller has when making decisions. One "heuristic trap" is the "commitment" trap. For me, "commitment traps" manifest themselves as summit fever.
I know I get summit fever. I'm a driven kind of guy in my work life and recreation. I've tried to recognize my summit fever. I've warned new partners that I tend to have a go-for-it; balls to the walls attitude. My wife and my regular partners know its there. By recognizing this weakness in my risk assessment skills I thought I'd gone a long way to getting it under control.
This last trip I did - sessioning big exposed north faces right after a storm cycle shows me that I have a long way to go. This stream of consciousness is an attempt to self-diagnose my thought process. In doing so, I hope to have a written record so I can look back and remind myself of what I perceive to be my biggest weakness. Really I don't want to become another "at least he died doing what he loved doing". I discussed all of this with Brian and got his OK to post this here.
Things I think I did well were as follows:
- My approach to all these N faces were quite safe with one exception. I was never badly exposed on the approaches and uptracks.
- I stuck to my decision to dig a pit to assess the new snow and how it was bonding.
- I involved Brian in all the decision-making
- I stayed away from S and E faces correctly identifying the presence of melt-freeze
Things I think I really didn't do too well were as follows:
- I saw the avalanche advisory that day. It highlighted some deep instabilities (surface hoar) and the fact that crown lines of between 80 - 100 cms of depth had pulled out on N faces. Despite knowing this I still elected to ski N faces.
- Despite knowing that slabs had run up to 100 cms deep in the snowpack my pit was hasty. I only tested the new 60cms of snow and only with one sample column. Looking back on this, I think that perhaps I just didn't want to know if the deep layers would go. I was trying to just get the good data
- I skied N faces and ski-cut aggresively despite knowing that if something went, it would go big and no amount of speed on my ski cut would save me from a big avalanche.
- Despite trying to involve Brian in decision-making, I am the more-experienced tourer with familiarity with the terrain. It isn't really fair to say that decisions were equal since the reality was that I was calling the shots most of the trip.
- There were 3 significant avalanches in the Whistler/Blackcomb area over the last 48 hours on this new 60cms of storm snow - 1 inbounds and 2 out of bounds. I ignored that data rationalizing that I was going 12 hours after the storm event was over.
- I also ignored the fact that it was unseasonably cold for April and that coldness would slow down stabilization of the snowpack.
To sum it up, I had big time summit fever and was so happy to find a willing touring partner that I went out and skied big faces. The consequences if an avalanche had occurred would likely have been fatal because (1) any slide would likely have been big; and (2) there were no "safe zones" to run to on any of the faces we skied.
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