Ukraine

[Toadman]

Pretty amusing Rod points to the Russian replacements for Ernst & Young as being particularly significant or a surprise. There’s an irony in someone with Rod’s level of childlike naïveté accusing the sanctions organizers of not thinking things through.



It’s not like Russia will create an in house semi conductor industry. And the limitations on access to foreign reserves will eventually lead to Russian defaults.

The real news bullet points from the misguided invasion is that they fucked up the 3 day invasion of Kyiv, underestimated the breadth of Western sanctions support, and didn’t foresee the depth of actions against their financial system.

Scholars and lawyers who follow this stuff are actually nervous about the precedents that have now been set in these areas. Arguably undermining the sovereignty of the Russian state.

The cluster that is Putin's 3 day special military op has most definitely given pause to China's ambitions on Taiwan. Not that China won't try and take it by force and some point, but they no doubt are studying all of Putin's mistakes. And is it really worth it to China to take it by force.

[Cono Este]

There are people in Taiwan that are partial to China.

Not trying to spoil anyone’s plan for Armageddon. But food for thought. It may happen another way. Everyone has their price.

[grinch]

I guess pooty is busy atm. Id expect him to hop back in the thread to thank comRod

Sent from my SM-A536W using TGR Forums mobile app

[Casey E]

Russia has helped create a novel grey logistics setup to distribute oil and derivatives, and import war supplies, basically extending their crime empire.

Operating in this twilight zone of international law has many implications, and may end in ecological disasters. The economist analyzed this recently

https://www.economist.com/finance-an...dustrial-scale

The Economist has spoken to a range of intermediaries in the oil market, and studied evidence from across the supply chain, to assess the effect of the sanctions and get a sense of what will happen next. We find, to the West’s chagrin and Russia’s relief, that the new “shadow” shipping and financing infrastructure is robust and extensive. Rather than fade away, the grey market stands ready to expand when the next set of sanctions is enforced.

Russia’s exports, which last year counted for more than 10% of globally traded volumes, took a hit after Europe’s salvo in December. Two months on, though, they have recovered to levels last seen in June. The volume of oil on water, which climbs when the market jams up, is back to normal. As expected, China and India are picking up most of the embargoed barrels. Yet there is a surprise: the volume of cargo with unknown destinations has jumped. Russian oil, once easy to track, is now being moved through more shadowy channels.

Some trade still uses the same Greek shippers, British insurers, and Dutch and Japanese banks that have long ruled the industry. This channel survives thanks to the price cap enforced by the West in December. That month, as European firms paused to consider the paperwork involved, the share of western Russian crude handled by them collapsed, from 60% to 13%. The legal trudge now done, the share has recovered to 36%. But it seems likely to drop off again. On January 1st the world’s biggest reinsurers, which insure insurers, decided to no longer cover shipping from Russian ports. Western insurers must now either exit the business or pass on the extra costs resulting from the increased risk.


At the other end of the spectrum lies the “black” trade, tried and tested by producers such as Iran and Venezuela. Battered tankers as much as half a century old sail to clandestine customers with their transponders off. They are renamed and repainted, sometimes several times a journey. They often transit via busy terminals where their crude is blended with others, making it harder to detect. Recently, several huge tankers formerly anchored in the Gulf were spotted taking cargo from smaller Russian ships off Gibraltar. Oman and the United Arab Emirates (uae), which imported more Russian oil in the first ten months of 2022 than in the previous three years combined, seem to have blended and re-sold some to Europe. Malaysia is exporting twice as much crude to China as it can produce. Much of it is probably Iranian, but ship-watchers suspect a few Russian barrels have snuck in, too.

As Russian firms can still sell oil legally to much of the world, this channel seems unnecessarily tedious. The share of exports flowing through it, though rising, is small. Instead, most of Russia’s crude runs through grey networks which do not recognise the price cap but are not illegal, because they use non-Western logistics and deliver to countries that are not part of the blockade. These opaque, dispersed operations rely on three main pillars: a novel cast of traders, a vast and growing tanker fleet, and new sources of finance.

Shifty shades of grey
Russia’s crude used to be sold overseas by the trading arms of Russian producers, those of Western oil majors and Swiss commodity merchants. These were mostly based in Geneva. But many of the former seem to have moved to friendlier locations. Robin Mills of Qamar Energy, a consultancy, reckons that more than 30 Russian trading outfits have set up shop in Dubai—some under new names—since the war started. As Western traders have withdrawn, newcomers have emerged to sell to India, Sri Lanka, Turkey and others. Most have no history of trading Russian oil, or indeed any oil; insiders suspect the majority to be fronts for Russian state firms.

It is this curious group which orchestrates the sprawling grey fleet. Since the eu first considered sanctions on logistics, the second-hand tanker market has exploded. Last year nearly 200 crude-carrying vessels changed hands, some 55% more than in 2021, according to ssy, a shipbroker. Most were “Aframax” and “Suezmax” tankers: with a maximum capacity of 1m barrels, these are the only ships small enough to dock at Russian ports. Demand for Aframaxes has been so strong that a few recently sold for $35m—the average price China paid last year to buy much larger vlccs, which can carry up to 2m barrels.

The fleet Russia can use to dodge the price cap now counts 360-odd ships, equivalent to 16% of the global crude tanker inventory. Were all Western ships to shun Russian crude barrels, the shadow fleet would be sufficient to keep Russia’s crude exports flowing at current levels, says Reid l’Anson of Kpler, a data firm. But many of the ships are more than two decades old, and they are undertaking very long journeys. Whereas crude takes less than a week to travel from the Black Sea to Europe, it takes 45 days to reach China.

As business has boomed, the new middlemen have had to find financiers to bankroll and insure their operations. The ability to hold millions of barrels without putting up capital, by drawing on near-unlimited lines of credit from the world’s biggest banks, has long been a crucial element of oil trading. In the case of Russian oil, which Western banks now shun, it is no longer possible. Instead, the shadow trade appears to be fuelled by credit from the Russian state, with the middlemen only paying for the cargo once they have collected the proceeds. Increasingly, banks in the Gulf are signing cheques too. Locals think they decided to step in when adnoc, the uae’s state-owned energy giant, started receiving Russian crude in November.


Securing insurance has been trickier. Oil shippers do not just need to protect their cargo and vessels. Port authorities controlling passages such as the Bosporus strait also require protection and indemnity (p&i) insurance for the cost of harm ships may cause to people, property or nature. The liabilities from an oil spill can be so big that 90% of global p&i coverage is provided by clubs of shipowners, mostly in London, which pool premiums. Outside the West, no private market has the muscle to extend similar safety-nets, says Ulrich Kadow of Allianz, a German insurer.

Yet here, too, solutions have been found. Since December, Russian firms, often new to the shipping business, appear to have stepped in to provide cargo and vessel insurance. Some p&i coverage, of equally questionable quality, is probably being offered by the Russian state. Insurance experts suspect some ports serving countries gorging on Russian crude—notably India—have lowered the level of coverage they require incoming tankers to have.



The grey trade has room to grow. China and India can buy more Russian crude: their tanks remain less than two-thirds full, according to Kayrros, a data firm, suggesting most of their purchases are being refined and resold—some to Europe—not stashed. On January 3rd China raised its refined-oil export quotas by nearly 50% compared with a year ago, notes Giovanni Serio of Vitol, a trading firm, perhaps as a prelude to buying more crude from Russia and selling the refined products abroad.

Incentives to follow the price cap may also weaken. In December Vladimir Putin issued a decree banning sales to parties that stick to the rule. The statement’s language is weak, opening the door to exemptions; many think it will not be strictly enforced. But the ruling, which came into effect on February 1st, could still cause a few buyers to change their minds.

Tanker, sailor, soldier, spy
Price rises would alter the picture more drastically. Today Brent, the international crude benchmark, trades at $83 a barrel, down from an average of $100 last year. Russia’s weak negotiating hand and high freight costs mean that its “Urals” grade crude was being discounted even before the price cap. As a result, a barrel of Urals, which flows from Russia’s west and makes up most of its exports, sells for below the price cap of $60. This tepid market makes life easier for anyone who wishes to abide by the rules. Yet many analysts think a bounceback in Chinese demand, coupled with weak investment in new oil supply, could propel Brent back to $100 in the second half of 2023. In such a scenario, the Urals price would jump, too. Some buyers would probably turn to the shadow trade rather than face compliance headaches.

[Casey E]

The next round of sanctions, on refined products, will also give a significant boost to the grey trade. In December Europe bought 1m barrels per day of diesel and other clean distillates, equivalent to 55% of Russia’s exports. Now Russia will have to find new buyers. China and India have little demand for refined products, and the global market is fragmented. Therefore Russia’s best bets may be the smaller markets of Brazil and Mexico, which will see their supplies dwindle as America exports more to Europe. Yet the fleet for carrying such products is small and the long journeys will worsen the shortage. All this suggests Russia will be unable to sell much of its refined oil, and will instead try to push as much crude as it can to the grey market.

For Russia, growth in the grey trade has advantages. It puts more of its export machine outside the control of Western intermediaries. And it makes pricing less transparent. Western estimates of Urals prices, based on few actual trades, are struggling to track costs. Indian customs data from November—the latest available—show the country bought oil at much lower discounts than those reported at the time, notes Sergey Vakulenko, a former Russian oil executive now at the Carnegie Endowment, a think-tank. Grey-market intermediaries, which capture costs such as freight, offer a conduit for funnelling money to offshore company accounts that the Kremlin can probably influence.

Meanwhile, Russia’s sanctions-dodging will have nasty side-effects for the rest of the world. One will be to further split the oil trade along sharp geopolitical lines. In December several Western majors, including ExxonMobil and Shell, said they would no longer hire tankers that have carried Russian oil, forcing owners to take sides. The other will be to make oil trading a riskier business. A growing portion of the world’s petroleum is being ferried by firms with no reputation, on ageing ships that make longer and dicier journeys than they have ever done before. Were they to cause an accident, the insurers may be unwilling or unable to cover the damage. Ukraine’s allies have good reasons for wanting to wash their hands of Russian oil. But that will not prevent debris from nearby wreckages floating to their shores.

[billyk]

You-Tube videos of M1A2s being unloaded in Europe and Bradley's being trucked on UKR highway system. That didn't take long.

The “Black Jack Brigade” from Ft Hood was deployed to Eastern Europe in January. This may be their M1A2 tanks catching up with them.

As I understand it, the tanks meant for Ukraine need to be built special as they can’t have (by law) the secret armor that the tanks the US army uses.

[Toadman]

Russian mafia was born to evade sanctions. That's what they do. But everyone along the Russian mafia supply chain takes a cut.

Not sure if Ukraine is getting these types of IFV's and these types of 30mm rounds, but damn, that looks like a trenching clearing machine.

https://twitter.com/Kiborgzzz/status...10977405513729

[Bunion 2020]

The “Black Jack Brigade” from Ft Hood was deployed to Eastern Europe in January. This may be their M1A2 tanks catching up with them.

As I understand it, the tanks meant for Ukraine need to be built special as they can’t have (by law) the secret armor that the tanks the US army uses.

I heard the same things. This was a video of them flying Abrams in one at a time on C-17s. Seems like an expensive was to get tanks anywhere. The Bradleys were most assuredly in Ukraine.

photographs showing Bradley Fighting Vehicles departing the U.S. for Ukraine's front lines have raised questions over the level of publicly available information on the shipment of military aid.

On January 5, the Department of Defense confirmed that it would include Bradley Fighting Vehicles in the next tranche of announced military aid. Bradley Fighting Vehicles are used to transport infantry in combat areas, and the U.S. has about 4,000 of them, according to Reuters.

Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Brigadier General Pat Ryder said the armored vehicles offer a "level of firepower" and protection that "will bring advantages on the battlefield."

[LHutz Esq]

I heard the same things. This was a video of them flying Abrams in one at a time on C-17s. Seems like an expensive was to get tanks anywhere. The Bradleys were most assuredly in Ukraine.

That's how Canada sent it's tank.

https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/first-...land-1.6261115

Now with our one tank in Ukraine our armored division has to practice with Zambonis

[liv2ski]

Zambonis...I love it. Thanks for the laugh.

[riser4]

That's how Canada sent it's tank.

https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/first-...land-1.6261115

Now with our one tank in Ukraine our armored division has to practice with Zambonis

Oof.

[Tri-Ungulate]

There are people in Taiwan that are partial to China.

Not trying to spoil anyone’s plan for Armageddon. But food for thought. It may happen another way. Everyone has their price.

Hmmm. Like there are people in teh TRGs that are partial to Russia?

...like you and rod, despite your protestations?

And apparently your price is very very cheap.

[Bunion 2020]

Uh oh

Ramzan Kadyrov, a key ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, has begun rattling off threats about attacking Poland after Ukraine.

Kadyrov, the head of Chechnya, suggested Monday that Russia should “denazify and demilitarize” Poland next.

“What if, after the successful completion of the NMD, Russia begins to denazify and demilitarize the next country? After all, after Ukraine, Poland is on the map! I will not hide that I personally have such an intention,” Kadyrov said on Telegram. “I personally have such an intention, and I have repeatedly stated that the fight against Satanism should continue throughout Europe and, first of all, on the territory of Poland.”

Kadyrov warned Tuesday that the time has come for the West to fall to its knees before Russia, predicting that the so-called “special military operation” in Ukraine, would be over by the end of 2023.

“The special [military] operation will be over before the end of this year. European countries will admit they have been wrong, the West will fall to its knees, and, as usual, European countries will have to cooperate with the Russian Federation in all spheres,” Kadyrov said, according to TASS. “There should not and will never be an alternative to that.”

[subtle plague]

Uh oh

Well, that's one step below Thursdays atomic Medwedew

[J. Barron DeJong]

https://twitter.com/kevinrothrock/st...qQFGgRIEy5emLg

[grinch]

Uh oh

We should give them poland so theyll stop!!

Sent from my SM-A536W using TGR Forums mobile app

[Toadman]

Domino theory. Once Ukraine falls, its on to the next country. I seriously doubt Russia would have an appetite to take on Poland and NATO. Let alone the men and material it would take.

[frorider]

Sad to think at one time Seymour had a good reputation as an investigative journalist rather than evidence-free conspiracy theorist.

[Mazderati]

I'd like to hear Seymour Butts's take on the matter.

[ex-powderbroker]

Sad to think at one time Seymour had a good reputation as an investigative journalist rather than evidence-free conspiracy theorist.

there are so many journalists that have flushed their reputations in the last ten years it’s hard to keep track.

[Core Shot]

I'd like to hear Seymour Butts's take on the matter.

Heh

Sy has been amazing over the years.

Try reading his substack and ask yourself if he’s compromised or being fed inside info.
I’m not sure. But it’s interesting


https://seymourhersh.substack.com/p/...he-nord-stream

[MultiVerse]

For the past 20yrs Seymour Hersh uses a single-anonymous-source to write fabulist fan fiction. Past tales include Assad never used chemical weapons (repeatedly posted earlier in this thread) that the Bin Laden raid never happen and that Bin Laden wasn't responsible for 9/11 either, it was an inside job.

This time around it's the Norwegians leading the operation with the Treasury department, the State Department, the CIA, the U.S Navy, the White House and the Department of Energy playing a supporting role.

Hersh's opening starts out laughably dumb and just gets dumber throughout, "The US Navy's Diving and Salvage Center can be found in a location as obscure as it's name..." which, uh, as anyone familiar with that part of country knows is a major naval base located in Panama City Florida. It's hardly "obscure."

[Core Shot]

Did you read his trope?

Maybe yes. Maybe no. How the fuck can I know. I don’t have direct sources. But Putin? Really? Putin allegedly blew up his own cash cow pipeline? Ok

[ex-powderbroker]

substack is the best fiction publisher around

[J. Barron DeJong]

Wasn’t familiar with Hersh. Was retweeted by someone I follow, but not for Russia info. Sounds like reason for skepticism here.