2 fatalities north of Silverton - Battleship

[beaterdit]

Yuck. Fuck "others" I only want to know what my peers would think. Others might as well be my parents or some random Karen.

I figured that was implied.

[simple]

I figured that was implied.

Kinda sorta not. All good

[kathleenturneroverdrive]

Maybe a good question to ask in the tailgate debrief would be "What would others say about our decisions?", or even "What would others say about our decisions if this had gone sideways?". Yikes.

It might just be me, but I ask myself that second question as often as possible before and during a tour. It's a pretty easy way to cut through all the clutter/group dynamics/justifications/etc.

[Bunion 2020]

All I can add is that I hope he had some life insurance.

[Kinnikinnick]

Ouch

I’m still wondering how it happened. Maybe we wont ever know but were they ascending or descending?

Was one in what they thought was a safe zone and the other triggered? Guess we’ll see what CAIC comes up with.

It took some time (a few years) for me after having babies for the added consequence to really sink in, so he may have just not absorbed and adjusted in such a short time.

I do have a peanut galley theory on Colorado snowpack: In recent years it hasnt seemed to me to be as bad as CO can be. Yes the junk has been there, but I think that people have been able to get away with more exposure than I feel like we could in the longer term past.

This has pushed the boundaries of caution from “whoa, considerable danger rating, better back way off” to “considerable? We did x, Y, and z in considerable and no problem, we’ll just be cautious”.


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[snowaddict91]

I do have a peanut galley theory on Colorado snowpack: In recent years it hasnt seemed to me to be as bad as CO can be. Yes the junk has been there, but I think that people have been able to get away with more exposure than I feel like we could in the longer term past.

This has pushed the boundaries of caution from “whoa, considerable danger rating, better back way off” to “considerable? We did x, Y, and z in considerable and no problem, we’ll just be cautious”.


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Further expanding on this, different problems have different consequences, probabilities, and visible signs, even at the same danger rating. Ex: Considerable w/ primary problem wind slab- it will probably be very obvious when you are in danger. But Considerable for PWL- you may not notice any signs, and then you trigger a big one. Most of the people posting in this thread are probably aware of this, but many people that have started BC skiing in the last few seasons may not be.

[Mudfoot]

Regarding the "Expert Halo:" Back in the 1970s I had the good fortune of attending an avalanche seminar in Jackson Hole where many of the top names spoke. When Ed LaChapelle (probably the top guy in N. America at the time) was introduced as an "avalanche expert" he said something I'll never forget: "Don't call me that, most all the "experts" are dead. If you think you're an expert you are dangerous." During his talk he gave several examples from his experience of situations where according to the science the slope should have been safe but it slid anyway. His conclusion was "avalanches are a bitch."

The classic definition of an expert is someone who just knows more than you about the subject. Be very careful whose hands you put your life in, including your own.

[teleee]

Be very careful whose hands you put your life in, including your own.

Love this! I hope you dont mind but I will be stealing this. I also really like the idea of a post tour discussion of lessons learned, I am stealing that one also. I do it now but not as a formal rule, that is going to change.

[Boissal]

Further expanding on this, different problems have different consequences, probabilities, and visible signs, even at the same danger rating. Ex: Considerable w/ primary problem wind slab- it will probably be very obvious when you are in danger. But Considerable for PWL- you may not notice any signs, and then you trigger a big one. Most of the people posting in this thread are probably aware of this, but many people that have started BC skiing in the last few seasons may not be.

Very much agree with this. The past few seasons in the Wasatch have featured a whole lot of considerable days that "felt safe" (without the benefit on hindsight I'll never know how safe things truly were) because the primary concern was wind loading. IMO that is the only avy danger that is somewhat manageable and for which a considerable day can be treated as a moderate day under the right circumstances.
If you're out a lot and keep close track of the forecast and reports there are are patterns of wind-loading that become very apparent and appear to be very predictable. These predictions can be somewhat validated when dealing with wind slabs because you can approach them relatively safely and test them without as much concern that the whole slope above is going to come after you. To me spotting a zone of concern, finding a way to approach it without exposing myself to the hazard, and getting it to go from the expected spot and with the expected amount of effort is somewhat comforting.

This year we have all the ingredients for a PWL to affect us for a while. I'm going to have the exact opposite attitude, meaning I'll treat considerable days as high danger ones. Every time I go out I'll remind myself that it doesn't matter how I rationalize my decisions and how confident I feel in my assessments, I'm just out there rolling the dice and getting away with it.

*italics to emphasize the fact that I'm no way stating any of this in absolute terms. I'm fully aware that I might be deluding myself and I've just been very lucky.

[beaterdit]

Regarding the "Expert Halo:" Back in the 1970s I had the good fortune of attending an avalanche seminar in Jackson Hole where many of the top names spoke. When Ed LaChapelle (probably the top guy in N. America at the time) was introduced as an "avalanche expert" he said something I'll never forget: "Don't call me that, most all the "experts" are dead. If you think you're an expert you are dangerous." During his talk he gave several examples from his experience of situations where according to the science the slope should have been safe but it slid anyway. His conclusion was "avalanches are a bitch."

The classic definition of an expert is someone who just knows more than you about the subject. Be very careful whose hands you put your life in, including your own.

Excellent, thanks!

[Vandeezy]

I do have a peanut galley theory on Colorado snowpack: In recent years it hasnt seemed to me to be as bad as CO can be. Yes the junk has been there, but I think that people have been able to get away with more exposure than I feel like we could in the longer term past. This has pushed the boundaries of caution from “whoa, considerable danger rating, better back way off” to “considerable? We did x, Y, and z in considerable and no problem, we’ll just be cautious”.

Further expanding on this, different problems have different consequences, probabilities, and visible signs, even at the same danger rating. Ex: Considerable w/ primary problem wind slab- it will probably be very obvious when you are in danger. But Considerable for PWL- you may not notice any signs, and then you trigger a big one. Most of the people posting in this thread are probably aware of this, but many people that have started BC skiing in the last few seasons may not be.

This really highlights the limitations of the current avalanche color system. Lots of emphasis on it this year for education, but to someone that hasn't experienced a deep persistent weak layer (at least in colorado) is already going in with knowledge/experience that considerable = wind slab/recent snowfall/easy to avoid sliding terrain. If you haven't experienced these events (which hasn't been terrible for a while now - maybe as far back as 2012) one could easily find themselves in bad situations making the same decisions they had on prior (but radically different) considerable days.

It is frustrating when the CAIC director has to say "it is the weakest snowpack we’ve seen since 2012", and they have to go loud in newspapers, social media, etc and then the color rating is the same as numerous other days. Really puts the emphasis on the end-user to be intimate with the reports daily, which is how I have learned for 15 years but most ppl can't read past a headline in our info overloaded world these days. Hopefully, all BC users increase their precautions now that it has been (unfortunately) visible across the state with these passings.

[snowaddict91]

This really highlights the limitations of the current avalanche color system. Lots of emphasis on it this year for education, but to someone that hasn't experienced a deep persistent weak layer (at least in colorado) is already going in with knowledge/experience that considerable = wind slab/recent snowfall/easy to avoid sliding terrain. If you haven't experienced these events (which hasn't been terrible for a while now - maybe as far back as 2012) one could easily find themselves in bad situations making the same decisions they had on prior (but radically different) considerable days.

It is frustrating when the CAIC director has to say "it is the weakest snowpack we’ve seen since 2012", and they have to go loud in newspapers, social media, etc and then the color rating is the same as numerous other days. Really puts the emphasis on the end-user to be intimate with the reports daily, which is how I have learned for 15 years but most ppl can't read past a headline in our info overloaded world these days. Hopefully, all BC users increase their precautions now that it has been (unfortunately) visible across the state with these passings.

Many joke in the Wasatch that all people do is look at the danger rose, but I've recently hd experiences that tell me that's not just a joke. I'm currently in a situation where I may be recreating in 3 different forecast zones, so I read all 3 reports *almost* every day.

[Bunion 2020]

Really puts the emphasis on the end-user to be intimate with the reports daily, which is how I have learned for 15 years but most ppl can't read past a headline in our info overloaded world these days.

I tend to agree but, well then what are the options? There are few ventures so fraught with gray uncertainty as skiing 34+ degree back country slopes in winter conditions. How you get that across to people who are uninterested in trying to protect themselves from what could be a horrible death? BTFOM.

Good discussion though.

[Tech Tonics]

Ouch

I’m still wondering how it happened. Maybe we wont ever know but were they ascending or descending?

Was one in what they thought was a safe zone and the other triggered? Guess we’ll see what CAIC comes up with.

Lots of rumors around, but the story is that they were still climbing. They either triggered it remotely from below, or it released naturally on top of them.

Either scenario is believable, the hard slabs have been significant and spanning large areas. And that day there was a ton of wind loading too. Either way, it seems to have come down on them from above.

Again, just rumors but, they also say that they both had airbags deployed and were buried 4’-6’ deep, one of them upside down.

I guess if you don’t have enough time riding in the matrix to float the top, an airbag isn’t going to help.

Super sad scenario.

[fastfroggy]

Accident Summary
Skiers 1 and 2 left Durango on the morning of December 19. They planned to ski in an area north of Point 12442, locally known as the Battleship. They were both very familiar with the terrain. They left the trailhead at the winter closure of CR8 (Ophir Pass Rd) around 10:00 AM. They skied up the road for about one mile before descending a south-facing slope into Mineral Creek. From the bottom of the drainage, they climbed east and into the lower portion of the North Face of Battleship.
The pair made one run on the climber’s left, or east, side of the North Face of Battleship. They ascended debris from a previous avalanche and descended adjacent to it. From the bottom of their first run, the pair ascended to the west through sparse trees towards the center of the North Face of Battleship.
There were no witnesses to the avalanche, but we suspect Skiers 1 and 2 were traveling uphill at the time of the avalanche. The burial locations and the trajectory of the avalanche debris also suggest the pair were fairly close together when enveloped in the moving debris.
Rescue Summary
Around 8:00 PM, Skier 2’s wife called authorities to report the overdue pair. She said the pair planned to ski an area known as the “Battle Scar,” east of the North Face of Battleship. A search began.
San Juan Search and Rescue deployed and began searching. A Flight for Life helicopter flew over and reported “significant avalanche activity” on the North Face of Battleship. San Juan Search and Rescue staged three rescuers a few miles up Ophir Pass road with a megaphone calling out into the night. With no further information regarding the locations of the missing skiers, significant avalanche danger, weather, and hazards associated with traveling in the backcountry at night, the search paused at 11:00 PM.
Three close friends of the pair decided to search independently. All three were very experienced backcountry travelers, and included an emergency room physician. The three left the Ophir Pass trailhead around 10:00 PM. They followed tracks to the base of the avalanche debris and conducted a transceiver search. They located and excavated the bodies of both skiers by 12:00 AM. The three marked the bodies’ locations and returned to the trailhead by 2:00 AM.
Skier 2 was found first, buried with just his hand above the snow (partially-buried critical). Debris covered him one to three feet deep, with his head about 1 foot below the snow. Skier 1 was completely buried four to six feet deep, about 100 feet uphill of Skier 2. Both skiers had deployed their avalanche airbags. They were buried around an elevation of 11,100 feet.
The bodies were recovered on December 20. Multiple agencies were involved in the search and recovery, including the San Juan County Sheriff's office, San Juan County Search and Rescue, San Juan/Silverton Ambulance, La Plata County Search and Rescue, Flight for Life Lifeguard 5, and the Colorado Avalanche Information Center.
Comments
All of the fatal avalanche accidents we investigate are tragic events. We do our best to describe each one to help the people involved and the community as a whole better understand them. We offer these comments in the hope that it will help people avoid future avalanche accidents.
Skiers 1 and 2 were very experienced backcountry travelers. The three friends who found the bodies were likewise experienced. The three rescuers were willing to accept a level of risk that was not appropriate for Search and Rescue. While they found the bodies hours before Search and Rescue would have, the swifter discovery did not change the outcome of the accident.
The lower 600 vertical feet of the North Face of Battleship is generally less than 30 degrees in steepness. The slope is studded with small trees, but otherwise open. The wind-sheltered and shady location means the snow is often soft powder. These factors make the slope attractive for skiing. There were many tracks from skiers who had skied the lower slopes in the days prior to the avalanche, and other groups were touring in the general area on December 19.
The lower 600 vertical feet of the North Face of Battleship is below an avalanche starting zone almost 2000 feet wide and 800 feet tall. The low-angled slopes are exposed to a significant overhead hazard. Traveling in this terrain means all members of the party are potentially exposed to avalanches simultaneously. This exposure is critical to consider when recent avalanche activity contains wide propagation or has been remotely triggered. Both were present in avalanches observed in the preceding days. This was the second accident in the Battleship area where avalanches started above the group and caught the entire party.
Investigators classified the avalanche as skier triggered (ASu) based on data gathered on December 20. Investigators encountered localized whumpfing and crackings, indicating easily-triggered avalanches. Tests conducted during snow profiles indicated high propagation potential (ECTP12, ECTP20). Skiers 1 and 2 likely triggered the avalanche from below the starting zone. On December 19, other backcountry skiers in the area noted the crown of the avalanche by 2:30 PM. Skiers 1 and 2 were buried at least 10 hours before the three rescuers found them.

[Kinnikinnick]

Lots of rumors around, but the story is that they were still climbing. They either triggered it remotely from below, or it released naturally on top of them.

Either scenario is believable, the hard slabs have been significant and spanning large areas. And that day there was a ton of wind loading too. Either way, it seems to have come down on them from above.

Again, just rumors but, they also say that they both had airbags deployed and were buried 4’-6’ deep, one of them upside down.

I guess if you don’t have enough time riding in the matrix to float the top, an airbag isn’t going to help.

Super sad scenario.

Damn. Airbags? Yeah i suppose you need flow to float and if youre in the deposition zone...

Sad stuff.

Ascending avalanche terrain is always dicey IMO. Even in the spring and summer I strive to minimize my exposure time. You are exposed from naturals above AND in the ideal position to trigger stuff above you AND very likely going for the ride or worse buried by it all.








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[ill-advised strategy]

I can also think of a handful of incidents in my part of the World where expectant or new fathers died unnecessarily. Having serious shit going on in your mind (positive or negative) isn’t conducive to good decision making in the mountains. Some of the closest calls I’ve had we’re in the couple of years directly following an emotionally charged divorce. These are the times when we need to step up and support our friends.

Yes, it may explain the yearning to just get some skiing in, even with dicey snowpack.

Also re: over 50...
Seems like there’s a trap where guys can’t really deal with inbounds and also can’t deal with sitting it out with a bad snowpack. I think the inbounds scene may appear worse and worse as guys get older and crustier and more (or entirely) bc focused. In other words, where a younger skier might be like meh...go hit the park or whatever, a guy who’s gone completely bc over decades, not so much.

Maybe not, just a thought.

[Tech Tonics]

I think the inbounds scene may appear worse and worse as guys get older and crustier and more (or entirely) bc focused.

This


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[ill-advised strategy]

Btw, sorry for your losses.

I hate this part of our sport.

Please be careful you guys

[Tech Tonics]

Skier 2 was found first, buried with just his hand above the snow (partially-buried critical). Debris covered him one to three feet deep, with his head about 1 foot below the snow. Skier 1 was completely buried four to six feet deep, about 100 feet uphill of Skier 2. Both skiers had deployed their avalanche airbags. They were buried around an elevation of 11,100 feet.
.

God this is hard to read.


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[XXX-er]

maybe bro dies doing what they love but if they realized the mess they leave behind,

they might give it a second thot, I been a part of a mess for 5yrs and its just so sad

[Danno]

That whole report was intense. Including the discussion of the 3 skiers that went in to locate the bodies.

[S_jenks]

That was a very detailed and sobering report. Really hope that it puts the fear into the rest of the BC community to tone it down until conditions improve.

I just hate how it takes a tragedy like this (almost) every season before the backcountry crowd gets the message. And it never really lasts, since there is always someone willing to push it too far. The ‘expert halo’ discussion is always worth rehashing early on in the season.

Reminds of that opening page from Snow Sense:

“If I could have my son back, I would hug him, hug him again, and then punch him in the gut. He knew better than this.”


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[powdork]

Yes, it may explain the yearning to just get some skiing in, even with dicey snowpack.

Also re: over 50...
Seems like there’s a trap where guys can’t really deal with inbounds and also can’t deal with sitting it out with a bad snowpack. I think the inbounds scene may appear worse and worse as guys get older and crustier and more (or entirely) bc focused. In other words, where a younger skier might be like meh...go hit the park or whatever, a guy who’s gone completely bc over decades, not so much.

Maybe not, just a thought.

True. In my case the knee injury made inbounds skiing much more painful. Plus I discovered dogs.

Plus older skiers are more likely to stay away from resorts during covid

[goldenboy]

For those of you who ski this area more often, I don't get it- is it standard to skin right up the gut and then stop 2/3rds (or whatever) of the way up, before it gets steeper? Therefore skiing lower angled terrain (which is of course connected to steeper terrain)? There are a couple of sort of similar tours here where people ski the flatter runout of large paths, except most of the skintrack is in deep timber, so at least the "safe ski" is fairly limited in time exposure.