Wind speeds that occurred on the day of the incident exceeded 70 km/h, and at the time of the incident, a wind gust
was recorded at the tower 8 wind meter at 75.6 km/h. The passenger cabin involved was empty and therefore its
geometry was more susceptible to the influence of wind loading.
Although other gondola passenger ropeway installations have been known to run safely under restricted operational
procedures at the wind speeds experienced that day, it is only from operational experience where these procedures can
be established. Since this is the first installation of its kind in this specific geographic location with no other passenger
ropeways operating in the vicinity, increased caution is required under these weather conditions to gain knowledge on
how to operate safely.
The person responsible for conducting the line check from inside a cabin lacked experience in the operation of passenger ropeways. This person was trained to be a passenger ropeway operator, but he lacked the knowledge to properly
convey what he was observing on the line. All areas of the passenger ropeway alignment exposed to wind were not
being monitored during an infrequent wind event that already prompted the operator to operate at reduced speeds. In
this instance, posting persons to monitor the ropeway in locations that could not be seen from drive or return station
vantage points would have provided better data to make informed decisions about operations that day and in the future. Access to these tower locations is difficult, but monitoring these areas when there are unknowns is
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