Page 8 of 10 FirstFirst ... 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 LastLast
Results 176 to 200 of 245
  1. #176
    Join Date
    Nov 2002
    Posts
    6,013
    May as well throw OSHA and Workmans Comp in the mix

  2. #177
    Join Date
    Jan 2005
    Location
    cb, co
    Posts
    3,648

  3. #178
    Join Date
    Aug 2006
    Posts
    4,278
    Quote Originally Posted by goldenboy View Post
    And just like that, CAIC must have heard us talking about reports, release Telluride Bear Creek report: https://avalanche.state.co.us/caic/a...nv&view=public
    Wow!

  4. #179
    Join Date
    Aug 2006
    Location
    Ross Thompson's land
    Posts
    656
    Yeah, thatís a fucked up situation.



    Sent from my iPhone using TGR Forums

  5. #180
    Join Date
    Oct 2008
    Location
    Colorado
    Posts
    2,745
    Quote Originally Posted by simple View Post
    I'm sure CAIC is being very careful with their report that involves an employee being killed by potential negligence. Yeah I went there sorry but lawyers will likely be involved by all parties.
    Not to mention the allegation that was thrown out that someone from above triggered the thing


    Sent from my iPhone using TGR Forums
    Quote Originally Posted by Benny Profane View Post
    Keystone is fucking lame. But, deadly.

  6. #181
    Join Date
    Jan 2004
    Posts
    3,847
    Quote Originally Posted by El Kanone View Post
    Yeah, that’s a fucked up situation.



    Sent from my iPhone using TGR Forums
    So they could not have done anything different? I agree, totally fucked up.
    Sounds like skier 1 was heading down and got hit from behind.
    Last edited by skideeppow; 03-22-2019 at 11:34 AM.

  7. #182
    Join Date
    Jan 2005
    Location
    cb, co
    Posts
    3,648

  8. #183
    Join Date
    Jan 2015
    Location
    Call-A-Rad-Bro
    Posts
    132
    "This was a commercial guiding operation that involved guides intimately familiar with the terrain. They decided that they could manage the very dangerous conditions by sticking to low-angled terrain. The natural avalanche that covered the road forced them to change runs, but did not cause them to reevaluate their avalanche hazard assessment. The guides determined that the natural avalanche released in terrain steeper than what they intended to travel through. They therefore did not consider this a sufficient indication that their intended descent routes might be exposed to similar, but larger avalanches.
    Past experience may have made them overly comfortable with the potential avalanche hazards. Their plans underestimated the threat from overhead hazard, and the potential historic size of avalanches. This was the largest avalanche to run in this particular slide path in at least 20 years. It can be easy for us to feel comfortable in terrain that we travel in often, but we need to recognize when conditions are outside of those we have experienced in the past and make more conservative decisions.
    The avalanche occurred when Guide 3 and Client 12 were in lower-angled terrain at the bottom of a large avalanche path. The group avoided traveling across steep terrain, but they were traveling below avalanche terrain. Their plan notably underestimated both the threat from overhead hazard and the potentially historic size of avalanches. When avalanche conditions are very dangerous, it is important to consider overhead hazards. ďAvalanche terrainĒ is not just a factor of the immediate slope angles, but terrain above. In dangerous conditions you should consider that the entire avalanche path is threatened by avalanches.
    Similarly, the regrouping point for the clients and guides was just outside of the boundary of the solid avalanche debris. The group was close enough to the avalanche that clients scrambled to get out of the way. They were struck by the powder cloud with enough force to shove some of the clients around. Although Guide 3 was tragically killed in the avalanche, it is fortunate the avalanche didnít break any bigger. It is possible that a larger avalanche could have put solid debris into the regroup area.
    Investigators believe that the avalanche was triggered by a large cornice fall. A third party ( two snowboarders) was in the area at the time of avalanche. It is possible that this group triggered the avalanche, but the avalanche broke several hundred feet above their last-seen location. Given the massive cornice fall along the crown line and the location of the groups when the avalanche released, we believe that the avalanche releasing after a large cornice fall is the more likely of the two scenarios.
    The guides did a remarkable job implementing the emergency response plan under very stressful conditions. Guide 3 was extricated and had a clear airway in under 3 minutes. He was in the ambulance and in the care of medical professionals within 40 minutes of the accident. Unfortunately, the rapid response did not save his life."

  9. #184
    Join Date
    Sep 2006
    Location
    Midgaard
    Posts
    2,728
    Probably isnít going to go well for powder addiction.

  10. #185
    Join Date
    Oct 2003
    Location
    9,300ft
    Posts
    17,723
    HS-N-R4D3.5-G
    Quote Originally Posted by blurred
    skiing is hiking all day so that you can ski on shitty gear for 5 minutes.

  11. #186
    Join Date
    Nov 2009
    Location
    CA
    Posts
    1,802
    Quote Originally Posted by Summit View Post
    HS-N-R4D3.5-G
    Quick, somebody threaten a lawsuit against the cornice!
    sproing!

    FS: crampons, lightweight winter down sleeping bag, and stuff https://www.tetongravity.com/forums/...ost?highlight=

  12. #187
    Join Date
    Oct 2003
    Location
    9,300ft
    Posts
    17,723
    Quote Originally Posted by meter-man View Post
    Quick, somebody threaten a lawsuit against the cornice!
    Emphasis was versus the reports from PA and the newspaper:

    No second tour group trigger.
    This was not a guide hit in a "normally safe zone" behind trees.
    This was not a a guide hit just by the road (which had been hit).

    This was a guide hit in the path, AND a client hit in the path, after 11 clients and 2 guides had skied. The guides made a decision to ski avalanche exposed terrain during HIGH danger AND to have a guide ski while a client was still exposed, and the safe zone was only just barely so.
    Quote Originally Posted by blurred
    skiing is hiking all day so that you can ski on shitty gear for 5 minutes.

  13. #188
    Join Date
    Dec 2008
    Posts
    328
    Wow, brutal. Seems like the official report is quite a bit more severe than the initial reactions.

  14. #189
    Join Date
    Nov 2009
    Location
    CA
    Posts
    1,802
    Quote Originally Posted by meter-man View Post
    Quick, somebody threaten a lawsuit against the cornice!
    Summit, to clarify, I was messing with the people on this thread who seemed to think everyone in the tri-county region should get sued.

    PA obviously fucked up huge.

    ETA the linky: https://avalanche.state.co.us/caic/a...nv&view=public
    Last edited by meter-man; 04-04-2019 at 02:55 PM.
    sproing!

    FS: crampons, lightweight winter down sleeping bag, and stuff https://www.tetongravity.com/forums/...ost?highlight=

  15. #190
    Join Date
    Oct 2003
    Location
    9,300ft
    Posts
    17,723
    ^Got it! I'm with ya!
    Quote Originally Posted by blurred
    skiing is hiking all day so that you can ski on shitty gear for 5 minutes.

  16. #191
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    Your Mom's House
    Posts
    6,360
    As was discussed earlier in the thread, it's obvious that the guides fucked up, because there was a massive avalanche and one of them was killed. I also don't really know how continuously restating "they fucked up" helps anyone actually learn anything from the event.

    There's a lot to unpack in this one, and in my opinion, a lot that experienced backcountry travelers can learn from, even if it is just reinforcing things that we already know. Here are a few keys things I noted:

    1) The Familiarity heuristic. These were people that were intimately familiar with the terrain and traveled in it very regularly. They moved through it with caution and traveled in a way that mostly minimized the exposure of the group (for the most part, traveling one at a time from "safe zone" to "safe zone") and minimized the likelihood of triggering an avalanche (by sticking to lower angled terrain). This was partly successful. They indeed did not trigger an avalanche. What they failed to do, however, is correctly identify the magnitude of the overhead hazard they were exposed to, underestimated the likelihood of a natural trigger, and underestimated what would actually be a safe zone under the current conditions. Do you have terrain that you know extremely well and have techniques that you usually use while skiing it? I do. It's important to think about whether your usual terrain and usual techniques are truly sufficient to stay safe on any given day and to recognize that they may not always work.

    2) a breakdown in safe travel protocol. The group had planned on moving one at a time through the terrain. This broke down when Client 12 got stuck in the flats at the base of the run, and Guide 3 did not wait for them to get fully to the safe zone before beginning his descent. It's impossible to know, but maybe the guide was going to assist the client? While having multiple people on the slope did not have any impact on the avalanche being triggered (since it was natural), it did result in multiple people being caught. I'm immediately reminded of a time earlier this year where I was skiing a run and took a tumble out of sight of my partner. He thought I went into a tree well and traversed out into the run where he could get a visual on me. I was not in a tree well and although the hazard on that slope on that day was very low and his intentions were good, we had a breakdown in travel protocol that led to both of us being on the slope at the same time. My point is, this shit happens to experienced people and truly practicing safe travel techniques requires more diligence than a lot of people think.

    3) Red Flags/Instability Clues. Avalanche classes from the most basic level up emphasize the importance of looking for signs of instability while in the field, one of the most obvious is recent avalanches. The guides encountered a recent natural avalanche but (apparently) did not fully incorporate the significance of that into their travel plan. The report specifically states: "The guides determined that the natural avalanche released in terrain steeper than what they intended to travel through. They therefore did not consider this a sufficient indication that their intended descent routes might be exposed to similar, but larger avalanches." This is me guessing, but the natural they encountered was on a different aspect, at a higher elevation, in a more wind exposed area, so it's possible those things entered the guide's minds. I've heard many times people say things like "well this slope isn't as wind loaded" or "there's not as much of a convexity here." It's easy to talk yourself out of recognizing the significance of signs of instability.

    Regardless of if you would have made the exact decision the guides did, on that exact day, in that exact terrain - my humble opinion is that every backcountry traveler that is truly honest with themselves has made one or more of the above mistakes. I personally don't think I would have even gone to Jones Pass on that day, but I can certainly take away lessons and hopefully apply them to improve my own decision making.
    Quote Originally Posted by Norseman View Post
    All ye punterz! Leave thine stupid heavy skis in the past, or at least in the resort category, for the age of lightweight pussy sticks is upon us! Behold! Keep up with the randocommandos on their carbon blades of shortness! Break thine tibias into spiral splinters with pintech extravagance!

  17. #192
    Join Date
    Nov 2014
    Location
    SLC
    Posts
    4,423
    Quote Originally Posted by adrenalated View Post
    ...
    Regardless of if you would have made the exact decision the guides did, on that exact day, in that exact terrain - my humble opinion is that every backcountry traveler that is truly honest with themselves has made one or more of the above mistakes. I personally don't think I would have even gone to Jones Pass on that day, but I can certainly take away lessons and hopefully apply them to improve my own decision making.
    Good post all around, but this is especially well-said.

  18. #193
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Location
    Posts
    10,902
    +2 on adrenalated’s post being good.
    And I guess that I just don't know

  19. #194
    Join Date
    Sep 2005
    Location
    PRB
    Posts
    21,340
    Quote Originally Posted by adrenalated View Post
    As was discussed earlier in the thread, it's obvious that the guides fucked up, because there was a massive avalanche and one of them was killed. I also don't really know how continuously restating "they fucked up" helps anyone actually learn anything from the event.

    There's a lot to unpack in this one, and in my opinion, a lot that experienced backcountry travelers can learn from, even if it is just reinforcing things that we already know. Here are a few keys things I noted:

    1) The Familiarity heuristic. These were people that were intimately familiar with the terrain and traveled in it very regularly. They moved through it with caution and traveled in a way that mostly minimized the exposure of the group (for the most part, traveling one at a time from "safe zone" to "safe zone") and minimized the likelihood of triggering an avalanche (by sticking to lower angled terrain). This was partly successful. They indeed did not trigger an avalanche. What they failed to do, however, is correctly identify the magnitude of the overhead hazard they were exposed to, underestimated the likelihood of a natural trigger, and underestimated what would actually be a safe zone under the current conditions. Do you have terrain that you know extremely well and have techniques that you usually use while skiing it? I do. It's important to think about whether your usual terrain and usual techniques are truly sufficient to stay safe on any given day and to recognize that they may not always work.

    2) a breakdown in safe travel protocol. The group had planned on moving one at a time through the terrain. This broke down when Client 12 got stuck in the flats at the base of the run, and Guide 3 did not wait for them to get fully to the safe zone before beginning his descent. It's impossible to know, but maybe the guide was going to assist the client? While having multiple people on the slope did not have any impact on the avalanche being triggered (since it was natural), it did result in multiple people being caught. I'm immediately reminded of a time earlier this year where I was skiing a run and took a tumble out of sight of my partner. He thought I went into a tree well and traversed out into the run where he could get a visual on me. I was not in a tree well and although the hazard on that slope on that day was very low and his intentions were good, we had a breakdown in travel protocol that led to both of us being on the slope at the same time. My point is, this shit happens to experienced people and truly practicing safe travel techniques requires more diligence than a lot of people think.

    3) Red Flags/Instability Clues. Avalanche classes from the most basic level up emphasize the importance of looking for signs of instability while in the field, one of the most obvious is recent avalanches. The guides encountered a recent natural avalanche but (apparently) did not fully incorporate the significance of that into their travel plan. The report specifically states: "The guides determined that the natural avalanche released in terrain steeper than what they intended to travel through. They therefore did not consider this a sufficient indication that their intended descent routes might be exposed to similar, but larger avalanches." This is me guessing, but the natural they encountered was on a different aspect, at a higher elevation, in a more wind exposed area, so it's possible those things entered the guide's minds. I've heard many times people say things like "well this slope isn't as wind loaded" or "there's not as much of a convexity here." It's easy to talk yourself out of recognizing the significance of signs of instability.

    Regardless of if you would have made the exact decision the guides did, on that exact day, in that exact terrain - my humble opinion is that every backcountry traveler that is truly honest with themselves has made one or more of the above mistakes. I personally don't think I would have even gone to Jones Pass on that day, but I can certainly take away lessons and hopefully apply them to improve my own decision making.
    A++ post

    Reading the report didn't make things look worse than I already thought, it was about what I expected. And this might be the most complex description of an avalanche that I have ever read:

    The avalanche occurred in a large, complex group of avalanche paths. Multiple starting zones likely released at the same time after a large cornice collapse near the top of the slope. The avalanche initiated on an east northeast-facing slope at around 12,000 feet, but it propagated across multiple terrain features. Starting zone aspects ranged from north-northeast to east-southeast. The wall left by the cornice collapse was over 15 feet tall. The resulting avalanche broke to the north and south of the initial collapse. There were a mix of hard and soft slabs that broke on persistent weak layers. Portions of the slide released below recent wind-drifted snow, other sections released on near-surface faceted crystals about four feet below the snow surface, and some released on depth hoar at the ground (up to 6.5 feet below the snow surface). The avalanche broke about 2,000 feet wide and ran about 1,000 vertical feet. The alpha angle was 22 degrees, which is close to the maximum distance an avalanche in this path can run. The avalanche was large relative to the path, and had a destructive force large enough to break mature trees and create a powder cloud that reached 15 to 20 feet into the air (HS-NC-R4-D3.5-G).
    "fuck off you asshat gaper shit for brains fucktard wanker." - Jesus Christ
    "She was tossing her bean salad with the vigor of a Drunken Pop princess so I walked out of the corner and said.... "need a hand?"" - Odin

  20. #195
    Join Date
    Dec 2014
    Location
    Colorado Front Range
    Posts
    3,011
    Thanks, adrenalated. You've been on a roll lately.
    Galibier Design
    crafting technology in service of music

  21. #196
    Join Date
    Jan 2019
    Location
    Grammy Jay
    Posts
    5
    Any thoughts on why the initial news report with comments by the sheriff's office made no mention of the client being caught or the fact that they had all just skied the slope? I understand there's always confusion after an accident like this but those seem like some very key points that were contradicted by the CAIC report.

    Quote from the news article:
    "The snowcat stopped at a lower level on the pass so that Berg could position himself to take action photos of snowboarders and skiers coming down the pass, Snelling said. After letting Berg off, the snowcat started back up and was about 100 yards up the pass when passengers heard a ďloud rushing noise,Ē Snelling said. It was about 1:53 p.m. at the time."

    Quote from CAIC report:
    "Guide 1 skied first and set the boundary on the skierís left side of the run. Guide 3 skied part way down and positioned himself on the skierís right side of the run to take pictures of the clients. Eleven clients skied the run one at a time and regrouped with Guide 1 on the far side of the avalanche path. The last client to descend (Client 12) was a snowboarder. He rode the steeper part of the run, but got bogged down on a low-angle bench and was about 50 feet from the rest of the group. Guide 2 descended and was near the regrouping point when Guide 3 began his descent across the avalanche path."

  22. #197
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    Your Mom's House
    Posts
    6,360
    Quote Originally Posted by ridge_skier View Post
    Any thoughts on why the initial news report with comments by the sheriff's office made no mention of the client being caught or the fact that they had all just skied the slope? I understand there's always confusion after an accident like this but those seem like some very key points that were contradicted by the CAIC report.]
    I have no insights to the reasons why, but my observation is that initial news reports (as conveyed from witnesses to sheriff to news media to public) of backcountry accidents, especially for less mainstream sports like backcountry skiing or rock climbing or mountaineering, are almost always wildly inaccurate.
    Quote Originally Posted by Norseman View Post
    All ye punterz! Leave thine stupid heavy skis in the past, or at least in the resort category, for the age of lightweight pussy sticks is upon us! Behold! Keep up with the randocommandos on their carbon blades of shortness! Break thine tibias into spiral splinters with pintech extravagance!

  23. #198
    Join Date
    Nov 2014
    Location
    SLC
    Posts
    4,423
    Quote Originally Posted by ridge_skier View Post
    Any thoughts on why the initial news report with comments by the sheriff's office made no mention of the client being caught or the fact that they had all just skied the slope? I understand there's always confusion after an accident like this but those seem like some very key points that were contradicted by the CAIC report.
    Because even being entirely uncynical, the news is there to dispense generalized, easily understandable information to a broad spectrum of ordinary people, not backcountry skiers?

    I would never expect any news outlet to do a remotely decent job covering any sort of avalanche situation, unless it was by accident.

  24. #199
    Join Date
    Sep 2005
    Location
    PRB
    Posts
    21,340
    Quote Originally Posted by mall walker View Post
    Because even being entirely uncynical, the news is there to dispense generalized, easily understandable information to a broad spectrum of ordinary people, not backcountry skiers?

    I would never expect any news outlet to do a remotely decent job covering any sort of avalanche situation, unless it was by accident.
    exactly. Because those little details about when the skiing happened relative to the slide or who was on the slope are simply not important details to the masses. What is important -- person caught and died and that person was a guide -- is the stuff they're trying to report. So while the try to get backstory to include in order to flesh out the news item, the small details aren't as important. Not to mention the game of telephone that might occur, as adrenelated mentions.
    "fuck off you asshat gaper shit for brains fucktard wanker." - Jesus Christ
    "She was tossing her bean salad with the vigor of a Drunken Pop princess so I walked out of the corner and said.... "need a hand?"" - Odin

  25. #200
    Join Date
    Oct 2008
    Location
    Colorado
    Posts
    2,745

    Jones Pass Fatality

    RIP

    Familiarity kills.

    Humans have a pretty strong ability to ignore the obvious. The first time you stand underneath a corniced slide path you may feel leery but after the 20th or 50th time and no bad consequence, youíll ignore it. You canít be constantly in a state of fear so you learn to ignore it.

    Then one day IS THE day but youíre still in ignore mode.

    BOOM

    They should not have been IN or UNDER Avy terrain that day.


    One place in particular that I feel the clock is ticking for a similar incident is South Diamond at Cameron Pass. BIG overhead danger, yet the commonly used ascent trail is straight up a terrain trap Avy runnout gully and then across a terrain trap flat bench directly underneath. And on a busy weekend people are all over both the uptrack and the slopes above. It isnít a problem until it is big time a problem.

    Sent from my iPhone using TGR Forums
    Quote Originally Posted by Benny Profane View Post
    Keystone is fucking lame. But, deadly.

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •