Does social media overhype avy danger?

[PNWbrit]

I've been skiing and sledding several days over the past few weeks in the same general vicinity (around Ingalls and the Jack Creek valley, a bit south of the Icicle, but who knows how far from the report) and have not seen any evidence of the same..

That sounds remarkably like what KM said about his recent ride.

you will eventually discover the reality of spatial variability

[plugboots]

I've seen it happen, but only during a storm with high wind. That said, he did not mention elevation, aspect or actual location, just "somewhere in the Icicle", and then extrapolates the risk to the whole of the central eastern Cascades. I've been skiing and sledding several days over the past few weeks in the same general vicinity (around Ingalls and the Jack Creek valley, a bit south of the Icicle, but who knows how far from the report) and have not seen any evidence of the same. In fact, I have seen no evidence of any slides in that area as of yesterday, and that's with sun in the alpine, which lets you see the evidence of expert sledders giving all the alpine faces a serious test. Overhype? Not sure if that's the right adjective, but not that useful in actual practice. It's good to know people are finding surprises, it's not valuable though if the data is not relevant.

Valid points. I’ve asked NWAC to be very specific about locations. He’s too vague.

[BFD]

he described the problem buried surface hoar. maybe people need a better understanding of surface hoar.
Surface hoar is an especially tricky weak layer because it can form very quickly. One calm, clear night—sometimes just a few hours—is enough time to deposit a thin layer on the snow surface. And once buried, it is very thin and difficult to detect, yet very weak. Also, it tends to form in a complex, hard-to-predict distribution pattern on the terrain. For instance it might form only above a certain elevation where the mountain rises above the clouds. It might form below a certain elevation where cold, humid air pools. It might form in a distinct elevation band where thin clouds form a “bathtub ring” in a confined mountain valley. It tends to form on open slopes as opposed to in trees. Also, when deposited on the snow surface, since it is so fragile, any small disturbance—especially wind—can easily destroy the layer making it very “pockety” i.e. you find it in one spot but not another. No wonder Canadian research indicated that surface hoar accounts for most unintentional human triggered avalanches triggered by professionals.
hard to pinpoint location he simply was stating it exists.

[PNWbrit]

^ That.

[Wapow]

he described the problem buried surface hoar. maybe people need a better understanding of surface hoar.
Surface hoar is an especially tricky weak layer because it can form very quickly. One calm, clear night—sometimes just a few hours—is enough time to deposit a thin layer on the snow surface. And once buried, it is very thin and difficult to detect, yet very weak. Also, it tends to form in a complex, hard-to-predict distribution pattern on the terrain. For instance it might form only above a certain elevation where the mountain rises above the clouds. It might form below a certain elevation where cold, humid air pools. It might form in a distinct elevation band where thin clouds form a “bathtub ring” in a confined mountain valley. It tends to form on open slopes as opposed to in trees. Also, when deposited on the snow surface, since it is so fragile, any small disturbance—especially wind—can easily destroy the layer making it very “pockety” i.e. you find it in one spot but not another. No wonder Canadian research indicated that surface hoar accounts for most unintentional human triggered avalanches triggered by professionals.
hard to pinpoint location he simply was stating it exists.

Agree with most of what you're saying, but in the WA Cascades we get (and have gotten - and will get more today) rain to the top of our local mountains in practically every storm cycle, which usually neutralizes any surface hoar and also triggers buried PWLs, as long as they aren't super deep. So, this condition is especially rare around here and is also typically incredibly localized. But in this case NWAC failed to provide any info regarding the local area or conditions that would have led to that instability and also used it as the basis for a warning against ANY travel in avy terrain throughout an entire region. The trouble with this approach is that the local avy forecast becomes not credible to frequent travelers.

[PNWbrit]

Agree with most of what you're saying, but in the WA Cascades we get (and have gotten - and will get more today) rain to the top of our local mountains in practically every storm cycle, which usually neutralizes any surface hoar and also triggers buried PWLs, as long as they aren't super deep. So, this condition is especially rare around here and is also typically incredibly localized. But in this case NWAC failed to provide any info regarding the local area or conditions that would have led to that instability and also used it as the basis for a warning against ANY travel in avy terrain throughout an entire region. The trouble with this approach is that the local avy forecast becomes not credible to frequent travelers.

[Wapow]

That sounds remarkably like what KM said about his recent ride.

Not sure what you're implying here, but you seem to be suggesting that I'm doing something wrong. I'll clarify my thinking so you can better critique it. There is no better data than personal observation and a ski track or even better a sled track is a better test than a pit and far better than a regional avy forecast. If I go to an area and there are tracks on all the visible aspects with no evidence of avalanches being triggered, then that is a strong (maybe the strongest) data point for stability. (Of course, there are other factors, but for the purposes of this discussion, let's assume the conditions have stayed the same since the tracks were made.) AFAICT KM was surprised by a new condition that occurred overnight (fresh snow and wind). He had been enjoying stable conditions in the preceding days and simply misread the changes and got caught. Not the same as spatial variability, but in the same arena in terms of "human factors". But I stand by my previous statement, if you're avid enough, you'll eventually find a surprise due to spatial variability. Case in point: The head of the Crystal Pro Patrol was fully buried on the day they first opened the Northway Chair, doing ski cuts for the big opening. He was saved by his partner. I was there that day and the stability was solid, except for that little gully apparently.

[PNWbrit]

The head of the Crystal Pro Patrol was fully buried on the day they first opened the Northway Chair, doing ski cuts for the big opening. He was saved by his partner. I was there that day and the stability was solid, except for that little gully apparently.

You mean this.

http://media.nwac.us.s3.amazonaws.co...nt_12_2_07.pdf

[Buster Highmen]

So information that incites questions and has a chance of making people think about a situation is bad?

[Buster Highmen]

Not sure what you're implying here, but you seem to be suggesting that I'm doing something wrong. I'll clarify my thinking so you can better critique it. There is no better data than personal observation and a ski track or even better a sled track is a better test than a pit and far better than a regional avy forecast. If I go to an area and there are tracks on all the visible aspects with no evidence of avalanches being triggered, then that is a strong (maybe the strongest) data point for stability. (Of course, there are other factors, but for the purposes of this discussion, let's assume the conditions have stayed the same since the tracks were made.) AFAICT KM was surprised by a new condition that occurred overnight (fresh snow and wind). He had been enjoying stable conditions in the preceding days and simply misread the changes and got caught. Not the same as spatial variability, but in the same arena in terms of "human factors". But I stand by my previous statement, if you're avid enough, you'll eventually find a surprise due to spatial variability. Case in point: The head of the Crystal Pro Patrol was fully buried on the day they first opened the Northway Chair, doing ski cuts for the big opening. He was saved by his partner. I was there that day and the stability was solid, except for that little gully apparently.

I thought Chris M got caught and it was Baugher that caused that incident and dug him out.

Anyway, part of the problem is that different people react to this information differently.

Some see it as crying wolf or data overload.
Others see it as an interesting data point.
Some see it as dickwaving.

Does the reaction to the information say more about the data or the receiver?

[mall walker]

apropos of the thread title/earlier pages, I was thinking recently that the UAC seems to have toned it down a bit this season

[John_B]

For the record there have been multiple observations reported on NWAC from the North Cascades East forecast zone of the buried surface hoar. That includes one observation that reported multiple human triggered avalanches likely on that layer.

https://www.nwac.us/observations/pk/3735/
https://www.nwac.us/observations/pk/3691/

[PNWbrit]

I thought Chris M got caught and it was Baugher that caused that incident and dug him out.

But...

There is no better data than personal observation....I was there that day and the stability was solid, except for that little gully apparently.

http://www.issw2008.com/papers/P__8091.pdf

The December 2nd event in Washington
State was two months in the making. A weak
snowpack followed by heavy snowfall and rapidly
rising temperatures provided a classic formula for
extreme hazard. All the members of three
separate groups were either partially or fully buried
during this event. Kevin Carter, Devlin Williams,
and Philip Hollins were buried and killed while
snowboarding in the backcountry adjacent to
Crystal Mountain. Stacia Thompson and Craig
Stanton were buried and killed while hiking near
Snoqualmie Pass. Stacia’s husband Mark was
partially buried in the incident but survived.
Finally, Christopher Morin was completely buried
while doing avalanche control work and was
rescued by his partner Paul Baugher who was
also partially buried by the same avalanche. The
decision making in each group was unique but all
groups failed to overcome the rapidly increasing
hazard

[Foggy_Goggles]

I think you guys are just talking about different levels of risk tolerance. When an avalanche problem exhibits large spacial variability, some people will feel comfortable balancing on the head of a pin and some people will avoid the backcountry all together. Neither approach is right or wrong.

This is the CAICs discussion from today:

The Steamboat zone has received more recent snow, and in many parts, the snowpack is deeper and stronger. The only layer of concern is a foot or two down from the surface, but only one avalanche has been reported in the last few weeks. These observations have been the basis for dropping the avalanche danger to LOW (Level 1). Sometimes, it's a hard call "going green" with known weak layers in the snowpack, but hey, welcome to Colorado. The flip side to that is there have only been 2 reported avalanches since November 1st, so that aids our confidence.

No large avalanches have been reported in the Northern Mountains since Christmas. A few days before, on December 20th, we had some powerful westerly winds that resulted in some large avalanches in the Vail/Summit zone. A few days before there was an avalanche accident on an east-facing slope near Jones Pass in the Front Range. This was the last round of significant activity with quiet conditions since.

This is not due to a lack of weak layers in our snowpack but more a result of lack of snow. Slabs that formed in early winter have changed into mostly faceted snow. We still have harder slabs of snow sitting near ridgetop, but even in those places, the snow crystal type has changed from tightly compacted rounds to looser faceted crystals. We don't have a great setup for the snowpack to handle a large load but overall snowpack stability is good, and the chance of triggering a massive avalanche is becoming less and less.

Overall in the Northern Mountains stability continues to increase. Many slopes are generally safe. Continue to use caution around big easterly slopes near ridgetop as this is the most likely place to trigger an avalanche. The next storm looks on track to impact Colorado over the following weekend. Small snow amounts seem likely for the Northern Mountains with possibly some higher amounts in the Flat Tops and the west side of the Vail/Summit zone. We will see what the wind does during the next storm, but until then the avalanche danger continues to ease.

Note that they avoid talking in absolutes. Avalanche Centers provide data and forecast. Users integrate this information into there decision making matrix. Nothing more. Nothing less.

[Buster Highmen]

The primary issue is to put self evaluation first: why do I react to the data this way.

If I find that some data irritates me, I should think about why and what it has to do with my reaction rather than blaming the data or purveyor.

I think you guys are just talking about different levels of risk tolerance. When an avalanche problem exhibits large spacial variability, some people will feel comfortable balancing on the head of a pin and some people will avoid the backcountry all together. Neither approach is right or wrong.

That's another way of saying it. I still think that the lens I'm using to see this ostensible reality through is what needs the most examination.

[PNWbrit]

The primary issue is to put self evaluation first: why do I react to the data this way.

As you know

A mutual acquaintance of ours was the last person to see Kevin Carter, Devlin Williams, and Philip Hollins alive that day. They ignored his advice to not go out and overnight in the BC. They told him they knew what they were doing.

Other acquaintances were in the group that found their bodies.

[Buster Highmen]

I don't know anybody. I don't understand anybody. All I can do is try to understand my own positions on things better.

[zion zig zag]

The primary issue is to put self evaluation first: why do I react to the data this way.

If I find that some data irritates me, I should think about why and what it has to do with my reaction rather than blaming the data or purveyor.

Great point.

[plugboots]

Great point.

I agree as well, I like these discussions. Remember, at its core, NWAC is just trying to help people stay alive.

[PNWbrit]

Agreed.

can we get this thread moved to slide zone?

[altacoup]

apropos of the thread title/earlier pages, I was thinking recently that the UAC seems to have toned it down a bit this season

Well stability had been relatively good this winter. So that might have something to do with it. I see no fault in hyping a shitty snow pack, especially since it had more of a chance of getting out to those with less knowledge. If you don't like and think you know better. Ignore it.


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[ak_powder_monkey]

IF YOU GO IN THE BACKCOUNTRY YOU WILL DIE

(so you shouldn't more pow for me)

[skifishbum]

#hugepottymouthedegobump

[trogdortheburninator]

Around CO, i find it's fairly rare that folks are skiing a lot of serious avy terrain at high danger. More commonly, that terrain is pursued when passes reopen, visibility improves, and danger is moderate to considerable. On those days, folks make a lot of seemingly aggressive choices counter to the advice (aspects, elevations, angles, terrain characteristics) of the avy report. Nearly all of the time, they get away with it. Overhyping the danger is one way of counteracting that feedback loop of continuing to make such choices.

I'm also in favor of as much data as possible from all users, and as much analysis as possible from pros. Learning to separate data from analysis is an important skill IMO.

[summit]

Around CO, i find it's fairly rare that folks are skiing a lot of serious avy terrain at high danger. More commonly, that terrain is pursued when passes reopen, visibility improves, and danger is moderate to considerable. On those days, folks make a lot of seemingly aggressive choices counter to the advice (aspects, elevations, angles, terrain characteristics) of the avy report. Nearly all of the time, they get away with it. Overhyping the danger is one way of counteracting that feedback loop of continuing to make such choices.

Let's examine the mechanisms of one side of that "feedback loop." I think this is more to do with the fact that people have no capability how to evaluate risk of high consequence low probability events either qualitatively or quantitatively, much less aggregate over time.

For example, 0.006% chance of you dying in an avalanche on a BC ski day seems pretty fucking safe by the sound of it, right?

Say I want to ski 50 BC days per season over 20 years with my ski partner. If were to I accept an average of a 0.006% individual chance of being killed in an avalanche each day I ski, then we have a 11% chance that at least one of us dies in an avalanche over that 20 year period. Acceptable? Of course that is a risk orders of magnitude higher than people would knowingly accept, and the real risks we accept are smaller as evidenced by the actual fatality rates.

WOW! Now:

How much risk do those advice-ignoring "aggressive" types take? I can't tell you! Do you know? Were they aggressive or just ignorant or were they oblivious? (Three different causes with the same effect)

How much risk do you take? How much riskier is considerable than moderate? Your touring vs 8 hours of driving? I bet most have no clue! The best one can hope to say is, "they are taking more risk than me" or MAYBE "if I do ski this line it is less risky than that line."

What we usually get is people trying to judge the fact that they haven't been slid as some sort of confirmation that their previous decision making has been good AND that violations of recommended practices are just "my higher risk acceptance."

People also may wrongly conclude that because "nothing bad happened" (TM) the forecasted avalanche danger is overhyped.

In reality:
Very few of us, excepting the bomb throwers who are also forecasters, interact with avalanches and evaluate them with enough frequency to truly evaluate our expert judgement in avoiding avalanches (as opposed to "expert observation to apply best practices") for such a low frequency event.
AND
Basically none of us have any idea what risks we are really accepting.

tldr; are we good? Probably we are just lucky.

For these reasons avalanche centers give travel advice based on danger levels and conditions. It is why much of the focus in avalanche safety is truly distilled to "in these situations, people who do A B and C are the ones who typically end up in accidents and people do D E and F don't" or "when people end up in accidents, we have noted that usually one or several of A,B,C,D,E,F,G factors are present and unacknowledged/ignored/poorly managed, so double check and address them in your situational management." Thus the goal is to reduce uncertainty and mitigate potential consequences while avoiding/reducing exposure. That is accomplished through best practices and methodically (and maybe expertly) sussing out risk factors to be avoided/mitigated without engaging risk homeostasis.