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Thread: So much for the "surge"..
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03-27-2008, 12:46 PM #1
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03-27-2008, 12:54 PM #2
Yes, it's looking like a real shit show.
Can I just say something about the "surge," though? How is this thing "working," when the "surge" plan was to jack up the number of troops and then quickly start drawing them down, when all the draw-downs have been postponed indefinitely? All they did was increase the troop levels to where they should have been in the first place, without following through on the most important part of the plan, bringing people home. And yet people are still buying this horseshit.
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03-27-2008, 12:58 PM #3
I can't wait for AJ's take on this.
Forum Cross Pollinator, gratuitously strident
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03-27-2008, 12:58 PM #4
Well, yesterday I heard that anybody being pulled out of Iraq was just going to be sent to Afghanistan. I guess they'll be staying in Iraq.
But, heh heh, no need to worry, heh heh, when we all get our beer money from the government next month, heh heh, everything will be fine.
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03-27-2008, 01:32 PM #5
totally hear you guys. Glad to see there's some smart people out there besides me!
Stay off my internet bitches.
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03-27-2008, 02:19 PM #6
Yeah, I want to say something (again) too. Even when the violence was down, how does trapping the majority of the pointy part of our stick (fighting military forces) in that sand trap for the foreseeable future help anything? It may have delayed a shitshow (until now?), but "working" is a completely stupid word for it!
Of course, I'm convinced Bush and the Repubs are just looking to calm the situation for a few more months and hand the whole mess over to someone else (prob a Dem)... then when all hell breaks loose there they will say it's all the new person's fault.If some of the best times of my life were skiing the UP in -40 wind chill with nothing but jeans, cotton long johns and a wine flask to keep warm while sleeping in the back of my dad's van... does that make me old school?
"REHAB SAVAGE, REHAB!!!"
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03-27-2008, 02:32 PM #7Merde De Glace On the Freak When Ski
>>>200 cm Black Bamboo Sidewalled DPS Lotus 120 : Best Skis Ever <<<
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03-27-2008, 02:50 PM #8
Pentagon focus grouping proved that s u r g e sounded 687% more comforting and implied that we were at least some what in control 372% more than FUCKING HELL!! WE NEED REINFORCEMENTS!!!!!
I'm sure that we'll soon be seeing trailers for a "short term up-swelling of friendly occupation" to deal with the shocking lack of confidence being displayed on the home front.
Remember if we don't market this war at home successfully we'll have to market it over there. it's your duty as consumers and voting but not counted stock holders of the invasion to unquestioningly swallow this stuff up to and beyond the point of gagging.Last edited by PNWbrit; 03-27-2008 at 02:53 PM.
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03-27-2008, 03:11 PM #9
Well something is going on if they are launching mortars into the green zone. Maliki didn't get to where he is now w/o the help of Muqtada al Sadr. If Maliki starts leaning on al Sadr and using the kind of rhetoric he has been using, unless he's pulled Muqtada aside and told he, "hey, I gotta say this to get Bush off my back." I could see a major melt down if Maliki trys to put a lid on al Sadr.
"We don't beat the reaper by living longer, we beat the reaper by living well and living fully." - Randy Pausch
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03-27-2008, 03:42 PM #10
Interesting analysis... Apparently Maliki wants to bump off Sadr. I wish it wasn't more like Charlie lucciano bumping off Al Capone.
Much of the current coverage of the fighting in the south assumes that Muqtada al-Sadr and the Sadr militia are the "spoilers," or bad guys, and that the government forces are the legitimate side and bringing order. This can be a dangerous oversimplification. There is no question that many elements of the JAM have been guilty of sectarian cleansing, and that the Sadr movement in general is hostile to the US and is seeking to enhance Muqtada al-Sadr's political power. There is also no doubt that the extreme rogue elements in the JAM have continued acts of violence in spite of the ceasefire, and that some have ties to Iran. No one should romanticize the Sadr movement, understate the risks it presents, or ignore the actions of the extreme elements of the JAM.
But no one should romanticize Maliki, Al Dawa, or the Hakim faction/ISCI. The current fighting is as much a power struggle for control of the south, and the Shi'ite parts of Baghdad and the rest of the country, as an effort to establish central government authority and legitimate rule.
The nature of this power struggle was all too clear during a recent visit to Iraq. ISCI had de facto control over the Shi'ite governorates in the south, and was steadily expanding its influence and sometimes control over the Iraqi police. It was clearly positioning itself for power struggle with Sadr and for any elections to come. It also was positioning itself to support Hakim's call for a nine governorate Shi'ite federation -- a call that it had clear Iranian support.
The US teams we talked to also made it clear that these appointments by the central government had no real popular base. If local and provincial elections were held with open lists, it was likely that ISCI and Dawa would lose most elections because they are seen as having failed to bring development and government services.
There was no real debate over how bad the overall governance of the south was at the provincial level, how poor the flow of capital was from the central government in Baghdad, and how poor government-related services were even in Shi'ite areas. As recent ABC polls show, incompetence and corruption are not sectarian. The south may be more secure, but Shi'ites only receive marginally better treatment from the central government than Sunnis.
Members of the US team differed over how much the Sadrists had a populist base and broad support among the poor Shi'ite Iraqis in the south, and how well the Sadrists could do in any provincial and local elections, although most felt Sadr still had a broad base of support in Baghdad. One of the key uncertainties that emerged during visits to the south was over how elections would shape up when there were no real political parties operating with local leaders, and in a framework of past national elections that only allowed Iraqis to vote for entire lists (most with many totally unfamiliar names) for the main parties and that made no allowance for the direct election of members of the COR that represented a given area or district. Optimists hope for a populist upswell; realists foresee an uncertain mess.
There were also differences over how much Sadr was waiting out the effort to defeat Al Qa'ida before allowing the JAM to become active again, and how much he was repositioning himself to strengthen his political and religious position for a more normal political life. In practice, he may be doing both, may be as confused by the uncertain nature of Iraqi politics and security as everyone else, and may be dealing with a movement so fractured and diverse that effective control of even its mainstream is difficult to impossible.
It was also clear that Basra was a special case. The British position had essentially eroded to the point of hiding in the airport. There was a fair amount of bluster about joint planning, training, and patrols, but little evidence of substance. Moreover, the power struggle in Basra differed sharply from the struggle in the other Shi'ite provinces. Basra was essentially divided up among Shi'ite party mafias, each of which had its own form of extortion and corruption. They sometimes fought and feuded, but had a crude modus vivendi at the expense of the rest of the nation. Basra also had far more Iranian penetration in both the civil and security sectors than the other Shi'ite governorates. However, it was clear that Iran and the Al Quds force continued to be equal opportunity supporters of all the Shi'ite militias, and that Iran effectively was ensuring that it would support the winner, regardless of who the winner was.
This does not mean that the central government should not reassert control of Basra. It is not peaceful, it is a significant prize as a port and the key to Iraq's oil exports, and gang rule is no substitute for legitimate government. But it is far from clear that what is happening is now directed at serving the nation's interest versus that of ISCI and Al Dawa in the power struggle to come. It is equally far from clear that the transfer of security responsibility to Iraqi forces in the south is not being used by Maliki, Al Dawa, and ISCI to cement control over the Shi'ite regions at Sadr's expense and at the expense of any potential local political leaders and movements. Certainly, the fact that these efforts come after ISCI's removal of its objections to the Provincial Powers Act may not be entirely coincidental.
Is the end result going to be good or bad? It is very difficult to tell. If the JAM and Sadr turn on the US, or if the current ISCI/Dawa power grab fails, then Shi'ite on Shi'ite violence could become far more severe. It is also far from clear that if the two religious-exile parties win, this is going to serve the cause of political accommodation or legitimate local and provincial government. It seems far more likely that even the best case outcome is going be one that favors Iraqracy over democracy."The trouble with socialism is that you eventually run out of other people's money" --Margaret Thatcher
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03-27-2008, 03:53 PM #11
Well of course it's a vast Neocon conspiracy. The whole thing was just to screw over the Democrats. It took you that long to figure out? What - did you briefly take off your tinfoil hat or something? Remember - you have to dring the Kool Aid every day. It doesn't work if you skip a day.
And I shot Al Sadr in the balls the other day. Aren't you guys paying attention?
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03-27-2008, 03:55 PM #12
wow^^^^^^^^^[to Mr. G's post]
Is that your analysis or borrowed? Pretty straight shootin there. Probably one of the most factual and interesting i've seen posted on this topic here.
imho....it's gonna get way worse before it gets better...Something about the wrinkle in your forehead tells me there's a fit about to get thrown
And I never hear a single word you say when you tell me not to have my fun
It's the same old shit that I ain't gonna take off anyone.
and I never had a shortage of people tryin' to warn me about the dangers I pose to myself.
Patterson Hood of the DBT's
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03-27-2008, 03:57 PM #13
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03-27-2008, 03:58 PM #14
I think its just gonna get way worse with no better at all.
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03-27-2008, 04:07 PM #15
Al Sadr, and his Mehdi Militia, needs to go down.
I'm glad it's the Iraqis themselves doing it, instead of just us (like last time).
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03-27-2008, 05:21 PM #16If some of the best times of my life were skiing the UP in -40 wind chill with nothing but jeans, cotton long johns and a wine flask to keep warm while sleeping in the back of my dad's van... does that make me old school?
"REHAB SAVAGE, REHAB!!!"
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03-27-2008, 06:08 PM #17
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03-27-2008, 06:55 PM #18
I live near the end of our grid and my neighbor's computer and TV both got zapped by a surge the other night. I'm so glad I got the surge protector when I bought my flat screen.
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03-27-2008, 06:58 PM #19
REMARKABLY quiet on the right-wing peanut gallery front today.
Chirp.
Chirp.Forum Cross Pollinator, gratuitously strident
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03-27-2008, 07:23 PM #20
So now I'm no longer considered right wing by you homo commie librodouche faggots?
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03-27-2008, 07:33 PM #21
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03-27-2008, 07:33 PM #22
Been peeved by this for a couple years now... But reading it nice and tidy and linked together makes it easy to cut and paste.
Bush’s heads-I-win-tails-you-lose argument in Iraq
We’ve been dealing with this kind of argument for a little too long now. When conditions in Iraq deteriorate, the Bush administration says, “We can’t withdraw U.S. troops now; this is when they’re needed most.” When violence wanes, those same officials say, “We can’t withdraw U.S. troops now; their presence is helping bring some stability to Iraq.” We should stay the course if Iraq improves, and stay the course if Iraq worsens. Either way, we have to stay the course.
Evaluating the “surge” has become a similar game. The policy is a success, the administration insists, because violence and casualties have gone down. That the point of the policy was to create conditions for political progress, of which there’s been none, is apparently an inconvenience that is supposed to go unmentioned.
And now that violence in Basra is erupting, and the Mahdi ceasefire may be unraveling, you’ll never guess what the Bush gang believes now. Yep, this is proof of the success of the surge, too.If some of the best times of my life were skiing the UP in -40 wind chill with nothing but jeans, cotton long johns and a wine flask to keep warm while sleeping in the back of my dad's van... does that make me old school?
"REHAB SAVAGE, REHAB!!!"
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03-27-2008, 07:35 PM #23
No I'm OK with that... even though it's clearly wrong.
I wrote a great post about this a couple months ago... I'm gonna go find it and add it in here... (elevator music)
Got it... Less impressed by it today than I remember being when I wrote it last year, but makes my point;
Last edited by timvwcom; 03-27-2008 at 07:44 PM.
If some of the best times of my life were skiing the UP in -40 wind chill with nothing but jeans, cotton long johns and a wine flask to keep warm while sleeping in the back of my dad's van... does that make me old school?
"REHAB SAVAGE, REHAB!!!"
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03-27-2008, 07:44 PM #24
Bottom line, just as they have in the house and Congress so far, they will disapoint when it comes to the war. They will take no bold action and it will fester and linger because people wont hold them accountable for putting us there in their in the first place. They will take no action that risks them becomming more accountable for that mess than they have to and as a result of people like you allready giving them a free pass to fuck up, it will never get better.
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03-27-2008, 08:08 PM #25
There are two key pieces to this issue. First is the surge in resources and the 2nd is the truce agreements. The key risk to the surge not working is if the cease-fire truce ends. The surge was an increase in troop resources which created the balloon effect the general mentioned. It lowered violence and also pushed violence (the bad guys) out of the areas where we have troop increases and into areas of the country where resources have not increased.
This is a common effect. So, the surge has worked to the degree it can. The surge would not have worked if we applied additional resources and it didn’t quell the violence where the resources were applied. This is not the case. The additional resources did reduce violence in the areas where resources were increased and naturally pushed violence into other areas (the bad guys went on the run).
It seems no different than when a city applies more police in an area to lower crime rates. Crime drops in that area, because of increased enforcement and also because the bad guys move into other areas of the city or neighboring cites where the policing has not increased. In theory, the way to address this is to apply enough resources to quell the problem at a mass scale – which means many more resources. However, the costs are usually unsustainable long term. One way to help easy the cost burden is shared costs.
From the article, “if the truce ends, the success of the surge is going to be hugely in doubt, said CNN International correspondent Michael Holmes. I've always said, yes the surge has reduced violence in Baghdad, but you have to put it in context: Why has it reduced the violence, and what else has happened?
It's a lot like squeezing a balloon, as a general told me: You squeeze it in Baghdad, it pops out elsewhere. Where you've seen a lot of the militiamen go, a lot of the insurgents go, is to the south and mainly to the north, which is why you're seeing a lot of action up in Mosul.
What worries me the most is all of the good work that we've done with the surge, spreading higher levels of security throughout Iraq, the people slowly gaining confidence in their own security forces -- that could all break down, Sheppard said.”
This is an issue that either the democrats or republicans will have to solve depending on who is elected. How long do we stay until we pull out? And, how long can the Iraqi government sustain itself as the US pulls out of Iraq. I don't see how we can leave unless the country is left moving on it's own two feet.Last edited by bigairnbumps; 03-27-2008 at 08:43 PM.
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