This is a good point. But it's the 'couldn't happen to me' that still overrides these thoughts for most people.Quote:
Originally Posted by The Gnarwhale
Public shaming has never really proven to deter throughout history so doubt it will have much lee way in this situation but I like the idea
Glory is a classic example of this. Everyone in town sees the tracks down the gut and wonders who the hell that was, yet almost every yr, despite avi conditions, someone always does it.
I always imagine it to be someone who must not know better so the potential for ridicule (or death or killing drivers on the road) just never enters their mind
There's more to this line of thought. The level of expertise and discussion in the backcountry/avalanche field can benefit from some of the growing pains of slightly older fields, and its good to see aviation in that list. The fact that avalanches and plane crashes are always due to humans exposing themselves to danger and fundamentally always come down to human error (although sometimes those humans are far away in the case of aviation) gives them a lot in common when it comes to accident investigation. Go back 75 years or more and you'd see similar attitudes about crashes as we see now about avalanches. Flying is incredibly safe today because accident investigations have successfully resulted in risk mitigation and redundancy replacing risky procedures.
A major key to that was the realization that accident investigation is more successful when the involved parties are not made to feel responsible. Even when there is a human error there is a reason for it and finding that reason results in better practices that avoid such errors or reduce their impact.
Pinning blame on someone and then shaking a finger and feeling better is a huge fail. Experienced people are often involved; you can blame that on a ton of different things, but experienced people follow patterns, and those might be repeated by others. Or prevented.
The hazardous attitudes list might be so well represented in this recreational activity as to prevent that, but to the extent that there's money involved it could still happen.
I think the article could be titled better, but I think the point he is trying to make is that someone doesn't drive to the trailhead in the morning with the intent of getting into an avalanche. The fact that an accident has happened usually means someone fucked up along the way, so let's set that aside so we can find out the events and thought process that allowed the accident to happen. Calling someone that died/was hurt in an avalanche 'reckless' doesn't add any value or lets us learn from their mistakes, it's an over simplification of the problem.
After a slide local to Telluride a couple years ago I remember talking to an older ski tech and I kind of launched in to a bit of MMQB about skiing a S facing slope when it was 50 degrees out at 4pm. The type of "obvious" mistake I wouldn't make. His response was "They must of been having fun." That phrase has been in the back of my head for the last few years and it scares the shit out of me. I think that MMQBing can be useful, but doing it tastefully is sure a challenge. I agree with what Sfotex said above.
Interesting points, although I'm not sure the aviation sector is the right comparison.Quote:
Originally Posted by jono
The safety improvement in aircraft involve better equipment and redundancy. Theres a limit to equipment improvements for avalanche safety, and there's not much opportunity for redundancy. Guess you could have both an avalung and airbags, but that's for damage mitigation not prevention. To me, knowledge and decision skills make way more difference than equipment.
I guess I was put off by the "hazardous attitudes" list for aircraft users - other than impetuousness and the macho factor, i didn't see much overlap with the human factors/heuristic traps in BC travel. Aircraft pretty much respond the same way to inputs every time. In avy terrain, ten groups could cross a zone without causing a slide, but the slope rips to turf on the eleventh. There's not much discussion about how to fly the plane once you start down the runway. In the backcountry, people are encouraged to speak up but often defer to "the experts". And pilots aren't put in a situation where if they don't fly today they are out big wads of money and may never get to fly that plane/route again.
I wouldn't expect a perfect correlation, of course, but I think if you look into the things that go into aviation accidents you'll see a lot more parallels than you expect. Maintenance is a huge issue, for example, and often involves discussion of 'should we or shouldn't we?'-type borderline scenarios. (See Alaska flight 261.) Manufacturing uses review boards to decide whether incorrect parts can be used anyway and the group dynamics are typical human BS, complete with profit motives. Same at initial engineering and systems design. The expert halo is not unique, although it may help perpetuate more urban myths in BC skiing. But the unknown and our human estimation of it is common to a lot of things.
A common thread in all safety related post mortems is that more than one mistake has to be made. Is avalanche MMQB there yet? It usually seems to get short circuited as soon as any mistake is identified which 'we' wouldn't make. Hopefully it is better and more professional where it's official, but since awareness and early education often starts with the public reaction/discussion there is probably a lot of value in improving its effectiveness.
Quote:
Originally Posted by telebobski
The safety improvement in aircraft involve better equipment, redundancy and TRAINING. SEE: Crew Resource Management from the aviation world. In fact, if you review the accident history in Korean aviation, you will see exactly the deference to "the expert" which you reference.
I don't fly A330's but I imagine if you hold up enough departure times as a captain that you might get some flack. Hell, the "show off" factor was a pretty big part of a spectacular B52 crash not to long ago.
It doesn't translate 1:1 exactly, but there isn't any need to reinvent the wheel.
A big problem is that once you identify the issues and causes (which are pretty much known?), you don't really have an institutional way to train people, because all you need is $1000 and some buddies and you can go get yourself caught in an avy. Not so much with an airplane.
WRT: MMQB, to me seems to be a complete waste of time without a proper report (IE-facts beyond a 45 second youtube clip). MMQB seems to be more about validating "my" perception of what went wrong and how I operate than taking a look at mistakes someone else made and asking myself "Could that happen to me, or do I have strong enough boundaries/good enough skills/enough information that that won't happen to me?". Lot's of accident reports don't have much education value for someone who has been doing something for awhile. It's the odd accidents that happen to experienced people that really get my attention.
Actually, the FAA and flight training in general has been taking a whole new approach to teaching lately. Focussing on human factors, and decision making more than stick and rudder skills. CFIT (controlled flight into terrain) is a good example. People have the fanciest GPSs with terrain avoidance and still fly into the side of hills because they don't trust what the GPS is telling them, or they are too busy messing with it to look out of the cock pit.Quote:
Originally Posted by telebobski
In the aviation industry, every incident and accident is reviewed. There is also an anonymous reporting system where pilots can report close calls that they had without being reprimanded. This approach has lead to many advancements in the field of aviation safety, especially incidents involving runway incursions, which have been a big problem lately.
The fact that many GA aircraft were built in the 70's and are flown safely every day, without fancy upgrades and equipment goes to prove one of my favorite sayings in both flying and skiing: "It's not the arrow, it's the Indian". Any pilot can crash an airplane, and any bc skier can be killed in an avalanche, training is the difference.
Jono, thanks for putting into words what I couldn't. Great points all around.
Calling out people that fuck up is how we learn not to do the same, without having to go through it ourselves. I've learned more from reading the the Avalanche Accidents in Canada series: http://www.avalanche.ca/caa/publicat...nche-accidents than from any textbooks. The level of analysis on forums might not be of the same quality, but I'd equate it to debriefing over beers after a big day touring, not necessarily eloquent but no less valuable.
BB, I wish you were right about this, but unfortunately I think in most cases it's someone with significant experience who thinks they can get away with it. There is too much recent history in the Tetons of high profile skiers repeatedly having close calls. The slide triggered on Taylor last week is a case in point.Quote:
Originally Posted by baby bear
Yes the Taylor slide still blows my mind. You are right that it was someone with significant experience and his reaction to the slide was pretty pathetic.
I'd say that maybe it's a healthy mix of the two though?... bc there are several people that I could name now that have taken avi courses, 'have experience' etc but still make bad choices and I would never ski with. But who hasn't been on top of glory with people who clearly do not know where they are going....and that big ol' beautiful snowfield that drops you right onto the road then seems like a good bet.
SPOT ON. I was guilty a few seasons and got a good wake up call.Quote:
Originally Posted by panchosdad
rog
Bingo. I was there, they weren't reckless, and common decisions were made that changed people's lives. MMQB folks believe they have all the info to judge what should have been done to prevent mistakes. Comfortable and cozy behind their keyboards the avalanche analyst.Quote:
Originally Posted by sfotex
If ever there was a classic avalanche, it was tunnel creek. I find it particularly disturbing that, in addition to a bunch of pros being there and getting killed, all of whom should have known better, that both a current and former editor of powder were there - and now powder publishes an article about why armchair quarterbacking of avies is bad?Quote:
Originally Posted by The Gnarwhale
wtf is that about? Because the NYT piece on the whole affair was the best avie QB'ing ever done.
A little thread drift here, Pat's post reminded me of it. I stumbled upon this the other day on our local outdoor forum here in Wenatchee. It's a POV of Armond Dubuque proximity flying down Glory Bowl gully, the slide path of the Tunnel Creek incident. Kind of chilling thinking of those folks behind flushed down that path.http://vimeo.com/56734613#at=0
On topic, I think the armchair qb'ing is done because sometimes the mistakes others made are so obvious that folks are incredulous and would hope that they wouldn't make the same mistake. It seems like a natural human reaction, kind of hard to stifle this kind of knee jerk response. That not to say that you can't do it without disparaging the victims, alive or deceased. Open communication is key for everyone to understand what happened and how to recognize and avoid the same mistakes.
In this case it may be an oversimplification, and quite clearly some people get really hung up on that word, but surely it fits some accidents?Quote:
Originally Posted by sfotex
simple - you seem to be arguing against introspection and change. If 'common decisions' lead to failure, there's a big problem with 'common decisions'.
the QB'ing of that tunnel creek slide was I think one of the best foods for thought I've seen in awhile. It defintely forced us to reconsider the trust you put in others when you are at 'their area' or a place you are not familiar with.
I'd say one of the more powerful post mortems I've seen.
Interesting point about the powder editors involvement and subsequent article.
A bit off topic but received the new photo annual yesterday and have only had a chance to look at the pictures but there's some good stuff
Nope. I'm not against anything like that. The only point i will make and support is that experts and analysts are never aware of all the factors. There is always speculation in avalanches.Quote:
Originally Posted by Hugh Conway
Sure, but hind sight is 20/20, I think typically in the events leading up to an accident people are thinking 'Things are looking good' until the shit hits the fan. I know a lot of people that don't ski/mainstream media are already thinking 'reckless' when they think of backcountry skiing period.Quote:
Originally Posted by Hugh Conway
One of the best features of the NYT piece on Tunnel Creek was the lack of judgemental tone. For example, they mention the rushed sense of urgency after the venture was delayed by a meeting but they leave it to the reader to recognize that this pent up anxiousness may not have been good for objective decision-making. That's good journalism, but obviously qualified accident analysts should go further; maybe identify a procedural improvement such as the need to stop and change mindsets once on the snow or some similar conclusion. I think the article here falls into the same trap it's warning about with that title, but I don't think the point is applicable to pieces that promote an objective analysis so much as it is to, say, Lou Dawson saying Sheep Creek could have been avoided with just 50m of path shift...not to mention all the name calling on forums that sometimes falls lower, but that's all hit and miss of course.
I think one of the reflexes we have with these is to be incredulous that one simple mistake had such consequences. So the urge to shake our fists at the sky and wonder why they couldn't have just changed one simple thing leads to comments that come off poorly despite better intentions. That's about as much of my navel as I have time for, though; this is interesting if it leads to improvement.
Of course the thing about accidents is that there usually is a chain of errors made (swiss cheese model).Quote:
Originally Posted by jono
Of course that intensifies the effect: inevitably someone spots one of the 'holes' and posts up "WTF were they thinking??? They should have just done this!!!" I'm just saying when this happens it's not always from a desire to critique so much as an inability to stifle. It starts with empathy but comes off as directed at the victim(s).Quote:
Originally Posted by char
Maybe an unhealthy mix of both, but certainly a mix, you're right on.Quote:
Originally Posted by baby bear
Yeah no arm chair quarterbacking going on from the recent Grizzly Gulch Slide. :wink::wink::wink:
http://www.tetongravity.com/forums/s...-Slide-12-9-13