
Originally Posted by
Hugh Jass
In the interest of public education and discussion, here is a recent experience to share:
Last Friday, after a day inbounds at Silverton, two friends and I toured across the road from the Silverton base area. I don’t remember the drainage, and don’t have the topo in front of me.
According to CAIC, the avalanche danger in the Southern San Juan zone was MODERATE on N-NE aspects near and above treeline and LOW on other aspects and below treeline. Having skied similar aspects the day before inbounds at Silverton, we saw bulletproof conditions from the previous week of warm weather, with 4+” of new snow on top. We did not observe any sliding of that new snow on N-NE aspects inbounds, but on S aspects, the 4” that fell Thursday night was “sheeting” on the harder layer.
Having a healthy respect for the San Juan snowpack, but feeling reasonably good about the forecast and our observations the day before, we headed out on a bluebird day. 14 degrees at the trailhead, with high-20s in the forecast. We skinned up the ridge, and topped out one peak N of the billboard across from Silverton’s billboard.
We planned to ski a slide path N-NE aspect, generally hugging trees skier’s right, with plenty of safe zones and duckable options. We discussed safety protocol – skiing one at a time, SZ to SZ, and spotting one another. I put in 3 big ski cuts near the top, and nothing moved. We did not dig a pit, for the following reasons:
a) the CAIC forecast
b) nothing moved on ski cuts
c) pole testing yielded no suspicious layers
I’m not defending this decision at all. I am typically very conservative, and swear by the rutschblock test. Despite the obvious pow in our line, I think we were exhibiting a “spring skiing” mentality, given the CAIC forecast and recent extended warm temps. Heuristic factors, to be sure.
We skied the line, using safety protocol described above, bailing out about 200’ vert above the bottom of the drainage. Knee to mid-thigh deep pow, ranging from 35-38 degrees. It was good. We skinned back up a treed ridge parallel to our descent for another go at it. Skied down to our previous bail-out point and assessed what to do.
The slide path we were skiing steepened, with a small convexity near the bottom. It curved a bit, making the true angle and severity of that convexity difficult to determine. At the bottom, the force of slides had “cupped” out the drainage, forming an obvious terrain trap. Given these factors, we opted to traverse skier’s right, where we got into a sparse stand of 3-5’ tall trees. The idea was to get onto a slope with more anchors, and avoid the terrain trap below.
We traversed this lightly treed slope one at a time, spotting one another, regrouping in a full-size stand of trees to skier’s right (too thick to ski down through). Our third member triggered the slide, which broke about 10 horizontal feet above him. Hard slab, 3’+ crown, about 100’ across. He yelled to attract attention, chucked his poles, got his avalung hose in, and started fighting. Me and the other guy had a clear spot on him, and shouted various forms of encouragement. He hit one tree before latching on to another and hung on. The slide ran about 150 vertical feet to the drainage below. He traveled probably 50 horizontal feet and maybe 30-40 vertical before arresting.
Once we established he was OK, he skied the bed surface to the bottom. Me and the other guy gingerly traversed one at a time back skier’s left, to the bed surface, which we skied to the bottom. We assessed the slider quickly for injuries, then spaced out and made a run for the drainage exit.
The slide ran on at least a foot of sugar at the ground. We took a few quick photos, but generally got out without a lot of observation and analysis. The fracture occurred on a 30ish degree slope, but ran over a bulge which steepened to 40-45 degrees before hitting the bottom of the drainage. My general feeling is that snow conditions were worse close to the bottom of the drainage, which given its generally parabolic shape, was prone to a lot of sun reflection. I can’t say for sure, but I think the rotten layer did not extend higher up the slope.
Regardless, a few final thoughts and take-aways:
a) Our lack of pit/block test notwithstanding, I think our general observance of safety protocol was good.
b) We all traversed the same track, and it was the last and heaviest guy who triggered the collapse from above. His position in line, his weight, and the fact that he was on the narrowest skis in the group may have contributed to the removal of support, which initiated the fracture just above.
c) He would have certainly been at least partially buried, and given the slide ripped down to the ground, the probability of him experiencing some trauma from collisions with stumps, rocks, trees is high.
d) As Dawson’s blog notes yesterday, trees may not serve as anchors, but could present obstacles to collide with.
e) We had never been in this area, and our lack of knowledge drove us to the trees. If there was a better exit, we didn’t know about it.
f) The slider was wearing a BD Anarchist avalung pack. He claimed a higher level of confidence that things would work out once getting the hose in his mouth. I have the same pack. Our third now plans to buy one.
There you have it. Insight and constructive criticism is welcome. If nothing else, take from this that vigilance is always a requirement, no matter what the forecast.
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