The Human Factor

[MagnificentUnicorn]

People make the same mistakes in all parts of their lives.

I may have said this on page 1 or 2, that's why things will never change and accidents are normal for any complex system. People need to accept that humans are fallible.

[Hugh Conway]

As you know, there are fields which are "life and death" that have come up with strategies for coping with human fallibility. Apparently this isn't one. Shit, apparently it took 5-10 years for mainstream finance risk pap to make it to Avys. poor data seets + zero desire for real analysis = not much change and the same shit over and over again. (not counting the continuing influx of nouveau BC skiers. Who are nouveau in their view, not their appearance.

[MagnificentUnicorn]

As you know, there are fields which are "life and death" that have come up with strategies for coping with human fallibility. Apparently this isn't one. Shit, apparently it took 5-10 years for mainstream finance risk pap to make it to Avys. poor data seets + zero desire for real analysis = not much change and the same shit over and over again. (not counting the continuing influx of nouveau BC skiers. Who are nouveau in their view, not their appearance.

I deal with strategies that try and cope with these "life and death" decisions everyday at work, the OR, yet people still make mistakes and bad decisions.
Accidents are normal.

[SkyIsland]

I think the decision-making tools are there. And the data may not be great, but is there to a surprisingly large extent. The culture is there only on a group by group basis. Using examples from other fields, getting doctors to reliably wash their hands is surprisingly hard to achieve at the level of actual behavior, but ultimately doable. If you use some of the available decision-making tools, the WAH and Grizzly Gulch incidents would have been headed off at the get-go, for instance. Not using them is a choice, and needs to be recognized as a choice. Just like soloing or doing R/X routes in climbing, if everyone's explicit about those choices, and decides to accept a high level of risk, there's not even anything wrong with that, assuming peer pressure and an inability to process what a bad outcome looks like isn't at work (big assumption).

There is, for snow safety, also an odd culture of almost political correctness that I don't see in climbing. For instance, most trad climbers have had the experience of a runout feeling reasonable until all of a sudden it wasn't. So, "gut" or what feels ok at the moment isn't a great gauge. For snow safety, you can hear repeated talk of "listen to your gut," when gut feelings and listening to them lead to things like the Grizzly Gulch incident very easily. The photographer, on the basis of his limited data set, knew in his gut that it was reasonable to get a few quick photos there. So, consciously or not, failed to utilize established analytical tools that would have said this was high-risk even with gear.

[MagnificentUnicorn]

Another link to Powder made me think of this thread and the article. What happened here? Just watch part 5 and the piece never really seemed to go anywhere. Last post was over a month ago and no one posted after part 4.

[totaliboard]

So, "gut" or what feels ok at the moment isn't a great gauge. For snow safety, you can hear repeated talk of "listen to your gut," when gut feelings and listening to them lead to things like the Grizzly Gulch incident very easily. r.

im not really sure how you know who decided what, but one either listens to intuition/self or you listen to outside influences. admittedly thats a view from the high horse, but its my view none the less.

[iscariot]

im not really sure how you know who decided what, but one either listens to intuition/self or you listen to outside influences. admittedly thats a view from the high horse, but its my view none the less.

The two aren't diametrically opposed in "either/or". You present a false dichotomy, from way up there.

It is a spectrum, and the place where the decision comes from likely varies with varying situations, moods, what they had for breakfast, etc..., even though the decision maker may not realize it.

Thus the problem of objectivity.

Gut/intuition provides the least objectivity, and terrain and conditions provide opportunity for mistakes with no consequences, false positives, depending on the level of the decision makers risk aversion as perceived that day...right up until they don't.

Don't confuse gut/intuition with experience/skill either. Anyone can have a gut feeling, or claim intuition. That doesn't necessarily mean its valid. Just as all the numbers in the world added up on the little risk assessment card don't make it okay to go, in a no go situation or a pocket of no go in an area full of go. Just as all the skill and experience can still get you killed.

All of these can also save your ass and show you a good time. Use them all. I'm always looking for a reason not to go. Most of the many friends I had that have died, didn't tend to look at it that way, and didn't make it out of their 20's.

Getting up early, skinning up, digging a hole, and going home because the hole, your intuition, your skill, your experience, talking it over with your crew or partner, and that little card told you to go home, is still a very successful ski day in the mountains IMHO.

[covert]

i think it's important to note that experience and skill are not really the same thing ie. experience does not necessarily equal expertise.

[SkyIsland]

Another link to Powder made me think of this thread and the article. What happened here? Just watch part 5 and the piece never really seemed to go anywhere. Last post was over a month ago and no one posted after part 4.

They got to protocols and decision-making tools, and then just sort of punted rather than addressing what these tools are. And then went back to emotional story-telling. I can see where the tools are boring and from a casual read perspective it might have been more powerful to circle back to the emotional content instead for the ending. But, since the series seemed intended to have an educational side as well, they could have given a bit more room in part 5 to those tools, and even how they could have led to different results.

The paragraph on the need for feedback I think would have been stronger if they had then explained how decision-making tools and protocols fit into the picture as well. Realistically, the average person will only go trigger a few small slides on no-consequence slopes as a learning experience, so will end up with a very small sample utilizing only one or two kinds of conditions. Better than nothing, but then the natural temptation is to generalize in a way that is bound to be faulty, which is where the tools come in.

[iscariot]

i think it's important to note that experience and skill are not really the same thing ie. experience does not necessarily equal expertise.

I agree. In my post I was attempting to echo CookieMonster's Post #40 from this thread, which I also agree with.

I fear that you're still missing the point. Incompetence is when someone can't / won't / doesn't use their training to manage/overcome susceptibility to human factors, or when they don't rigourously apply their training, or when they pick and choose best practices, or when they ignore obvious signs of instability, or when they fail to follow even the most basic principles of backcountry avalanche forecasting and decision making with respect to margin of safety. Incompetence is when someone conflates their accumulated experience as a backcountry skier with actually being skilled at backcountry avalanche forecasting and decision-making or any other principle of winter mountain safety. Knowing how to do something ( experience ) is not the same as knowing how to do something the right way ( skill ).

So much of this talk about human factors seems to paint backcountry skiers as zombies devoid of free will who have had their agency removed. This is very rarely true and it is especially untrue for backcountry skiers who are aware of these issues beforehand. Assuming we're talking about legally competent adults, then I absolutely cannot see how someone is "unable" to use their training to tour in competent fashion. I think it's much more fair to say that people become lazy and complacent and just do what they want, with small varnishes of safety added on for effect. The thing is that the physics of snow and avalanches mean that being complacent and lazy and using small varnishes of safety is almost always good enough. Until it's not.

[totaliboard]

Gut/intuition provides the least objectivity

not sure i agree with that, but whatever

Don't confuse gut/intuition with experience/skill either.

the two aren't really very similar at all.. but in hopes of contributing something instead of just being a dick, ill propose a theory I have: The majority of avalanche incidents are a result of previous experience (lacking or not) and poor impulse control. when I say impulse, I am thinking of the heuristic traps that one finds themselves victims of right around the time of said [hypothetical] incident.

[iscariot]

not sure i agree with that, but whatever



the two aren't really very similar at all.. but in hopes of contributing something instead of just being a dick, ill propose a theory I have: The majority of avalanche incidents are a result of previous experience (lacking or not) and poor impulse control. when I say impulse, I am thinking of the heuristic traps that one finds themselves victims of right around the time of said [hypothetical] incident.

in·tu·i·tion/ˌint(y)o͞oˈiSH(ə)n/
noun

the ability to understand something immediately, without the need for conscious reasoning.


So if there is no need for conscious reasoning, then why teach avy info/skill/courses at all?


If it is simply innate intuition, and anyone can only (diametrically) either listen to their intuition or listen to others, then there are some very simple and universal tests we can use to decide who is or is not allowed in avalanche terrain.

This will end deaths by avalanche. Huzzah!