Thread: An honest (armchair) discussion of the 11/13/11 Gad Valley avalanche accident.

A lot of thread drift in the RIP JP and Wasatch Conditions threads so I figure this would be a good place to discuss this stuff. I don't want to put the victim's name in the thread so it won't pop up for family members on the Googles.

UAC Accident Summary

Is there really that much to discuss.....?

booterin up a +30 degree convex shot the sar pres my bro and I were sketched to ski early dec last season on a moderate day that drew h choose to tell the story of the alta mailman that deliverered for years who stayed home the day after storms so as not to die
don't know if dude didn't get it, rolled w/ faith in a higher power, spent a lot of time inbounds where most of your snow safety decisions are made for you or thought skill and balls would see him through, perhaps the need to go pro stoker out to appease those who made it possible to ski for a livin don't know don't really need to know
not carrying avvy/1st aid /selfrescue supplies = bizzare to me
mrs. said gmd lot was full that day
seems a whole lot of peeps had some early season fun and a few pushed a bit hardnot surprised saddened but
gonna do what my skibum ass can to see that his fam and kids are taken care of
hope others do likewise

stopping to answer smart phone while bootering up said shot next to the shot that buried a steamboat troller
and sent a backcountryeditor for a ride and neatr another tragic past wasatch fatality in those conditions also = mindbogglin to me
but i am but a mear under edjumacated ski bum

I knew JP, but not well. I would see him on the tram dock and chat sometimes, also had some conversations with him at the boot shop where we all know each other. We had the same truck and would sometimes discuss suspension setups and whatnot. Met his kids there and the puppy he had to adopt out because it turned out one of them was allergic. No question he was devoted to his family. This is why at first I was was pissed at him for not having gear, for blatantly disregarding the obvious instability all around him, and for dropping into the serious terrain that he did. Now I'm starting to see some of the heuristic traps that may have lured the party into the decisions they made.

I have never known JP to wear a helmet. No question rescue gear is requisite for skiing in the backcountry but I think helmets are also extremely prudent and should be worn by anyone in avi terrain, even on the climb, though I usually get too hot in mine. I don't know if it would have made the difference for JP, it didn't for my friend Heather but still, any edge you can give yourself seems like a god idea to me.

I thought these were some points worth noting:

Originally Posted by telemike

Slaag Master - you are right - this is who we are and this is what we do

but, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT

yeah, well, we gotta do it better than that

we have a responsibility to family, friends, Maggots, etc. to do it better

do you know how many people I have lost doing what they loved?

I don't - way too many

sure, he's going to Heaven to ski with God - but he'll never ski with his wife and kids and bros and hos again -I'll never get to meet him - he'll never do anything to inspire us again -

you think he died happy to be doing what he loved? most likely, he died scared shitless and beaten and broken and alone - I can't even imagine how his touring partner feels - or his wife and family and friends - Jamie can rest in peace, but can they?

JP and his partner were not prepared for the coditions they encountered - that is unprofessional and not the way to roll in your personal life - that's how you die


maybe it wouldn't have mattered, but I wish I read that he was with a prepared partner who did what they could to rescue him

apologies if I am out of line - this sort of shit REALLY matters to me - I considered making an alias to post this, but fuck it - I do not want to lose any of you a-holes like this if I can help avoid it

This point has been on my mind a lot. We all have responsibilities to those who care for us and those who will put it on the line to rescue us to be the most observant and most prepared backcountry skiers we can be. When dropping in, we need to think of those people, as well as all of our friends whom we have lost in the backcountry. Someone in the other thread this was their 'governor' when making decisions. I think it's a good thing to add to the process.

Originally Posted by wasatchcrawler

Jamie was an old acquaintance of mine from working at the bird in the early 1990s. I had not talked to him in probably 15 years until I skinned up behind him and his friend on the shoulder of Baldy at Alta yesterday. We talked for 5 or 10 minutes about old times at the bird and what was going on lately in our lives. We wished each other well and to have a fun, safe day. About 15 minutes later, I put my gear together on the ridgeline and was preparing to make my run off of east facing Baldy shoulder when I heard loud whoophing noise. Some 200 feet to the east of me a section of upper Baldy avalanched and rumbled down a chute, exploding at the bottom in a huge dust cloud, it freaked me out (this was not the avalanche Jamie was involved in). I was probably one of the last people to ever talk to Jamie and he was happy to be making turns that day like the rest of us. I feel sick inside today, rest in peace Jamie, my deepest sympathies to your family.

This is scary, I was on the skinner up to Baldy last week, before all the new snow. It was further west than usually due thin snow and I was surprised to be only about 50 yards from memorial buttress at Snowbird. The terrain changes from the relative safety of the Baldy north ridge to the large slide paths of north Baldy pretty quickly right there. Unless you summit and then descend the west ridge you're heading into serious exposure to get into Snowbird. Did they remotely trigger the slide WC saw, if so, did they know it? If visible from Alta, this would have been pretty close in aspect to the fatal one.

Originally Posted by smuggs

vibes to family and friends +++

anyway i just thought about some things.

we saw jamie all smiles hiking up the baldy shoulder by wildcat at around noon. so if the accident happened at 3 then that is about right for taking a lap into snowbird, and then hiking up the cirque and dropping in on south chute.

so whatever they rode from alta was north west or west facing. im sure they rode into the bird, were confident with the aspect sent it up the cirque, it ripped, they said oh its east facing, more dangerous. this is like the slides we saw on the low sholder, then dropped into another but the wrong NW line.

rip jamie.

Smuggs is right here, and raises a an interesting point. They had to cross or descend west Baldy in Snowbird to later ascend the mid Cirque. Whatever they did, it was on a similar aspect to where they dropped into South Chute. The report doesn't mention activity in this area, or the [north Baldy] slide WC witnessed. Like Smuggs says, if they didn't trigger or witness any activity on these aspects, they may have felt they had a green light on South Chute.

Knowing South Chute though, and I'm sure JP knew it well too 'cause I've been in there with him in the early season, it's a bad place to be when there's ANY uncertainty. You've seen the pictures, I'll leave it at that.

Anyway, I'm still trying to wrap my head around all this. Knowing what we do but without having been there it was obviously "no-go". But they did, so I'm trying to understand what they saw and knew that lead them to to what happened.

edit:

Also-

Originally Posted by Alto

We can't eliminate risk completely.

Originally Posted by TheMessenger

It doesn't hurt to at least try.

So sad.

'Nuff said...

Who were the people still skiing above the rescue?

Originally Posted by DasBlunt

Who were the people still skiing above the rescue?

different accident.

I have seen some criticism of the lack of rescue gear. It's easy to pass judgment about the rescue gear. Why not ski with it all the time, regardless?

The incidents on Sunday, though, involved trauma. Even the big slide from the Cirque that the JP party triggered looks like it didn't have a real big deposition pile. I think that even before the day started, most of us would have predicted that trauma, not burial, would be the biggest risk involved in being caught in an avalanche on that day.

Are too many of us forgetting that to die from being buried in an avalanche, we first have to survive the trauma of the slide itself? It seems like the thinking all too often is geared around not getting buried, instead of the risks associated with being out of control on a rocky slope for even a short amount of time.

A few thoughts that had been nagging me. Perhaps the party observed the slide on the Cirque, saw that it was low consequences in terms of burial, and carried that thought on to South Chute?

Originally Posted by Lone Star

Are too many of us forgetting that to die from being buried in an avalanche, we first have to survive the trauma of the slide itself? It seems like the thinking all too often is geared around not getting buried, instead of the risks associated with being out of control on a rocky slope for even a short amount of time.

A few thoughts that had been nagging me. Perhaps the party observed the slide on the Cirque, saw that it was low consequences in terms of burial, and carried that thought on to South Chute?

I've been thinking the same thing. Everytime I've gone out, I've felt a little silly about wearing a beacon (mostly wearing it just for good habit), given the chances of a burial with the amount of snow that could slide, and the terrain that I've been skiing (no traps). However, avalanche trauma has definitely been at the forefront of my mind each time I've dropped. It's the early season killer.

i've got some thoughts on this having been out all day sunday and also a few times in the area throughout the week leading up to sunday. if i can put together a coherent and respectful writeup, i'll post up. the basic gist of it though: how did people not see the overall danger presented on sunday (not just JP and partner, but everyone involved in accidents or near accidents)? i'm no expert but I feel like I am beginning to learn my way around a bit, and man, there was no way I would have put myself in those situations on that particular day given what I had been seeing/hearing/reading.

Read this first before reading this post-
http://www.powdermag.com/stories/uac...gation-photos/
I was called out in the RIP Jamie Pierre thread.

It referenced a post I made last year about an avalanche fatality on Torres.

In that thread, I made a blunt statement somewhere along the lines of "victim is dead because of weekend warrior myopic tunnel vision". I had spent every day for the past week or two in the area, and it was very clear to me what the issue was.

I don't think this incident, from what I've read is much different. However, everything I'm going off is what I've read in the report. I have no first hand knowledge of the current snowpack in LCC. From what I've read, shit was ripping left and right all over the canyon, JP and his friend even triggered a big one earlier in the day prior to the slide that killed him.

I think it is easy to feel that early season slides aren't as deadly. I think there is some truth to this, but it simply changes the common risk of being in a slide.
Most deaths in avalanches are caused by the victim being buried and suffocating. I've read statistics of fatalities in avalanches being as high as 75% due to suffocation.
It's the second leading cause of death in avalanches that even myself needs to be reminded of sometimes...blunt trauma.

Do I think JP would still be alive if trauma was not a factor in this incident? Most likely.
Was it irrational to be out there without proper avalanche gear? Absolutely. How you plan to go ski an area which has not been controlled without gear surprises me.
I have left my avalanche gear behind when snow was really thin, but Snowbird is a very rocky place, and their final objective was a bad spot to be in, with or without gear.

Perhaps a better argument is wearing a helmet and protective gear as these things may have prevented this fatality. Never having seen JP wear a helmet, I'm guessing he wasn't this day either. Autopsy reports may lead to more conversation about this.
Being on a snowboard may have played a part as well. I'd assume he was in a pretty awkward, out of control tumble that the snowboard most likely played a part in him striking a vulnerable part of his body.

Do I think ego may have played a part? Absolutely. I don't know how you make one slope rip, shrug it off and keep moving to an even more hazardous area. Perhaps cooler heads would have bagged it for the day and taken a safe (but lame) way home.

I don't know why JP ignored the risks....but isn't that what made him famous in the first place? Doing what others wouldn't even think about doing?
He was rewarded for that type of behavior over and over. He made a life out of it!
The media, ski industry and everyone else condoned his risk taking up until the time it killed him....and now people say what he did was ignorant. Interesting, isn't it?

Originally Posted by Lone Star

It seems like the thinking all too often is geared around not getting buried, instead of the risks associated with being out of control on a rocky slope for even a short amount of time.

A few thoughts that had been nagging me. Perhaps the party observed the slide on the Cirque, saw that it was low consequences in terms of burial, and carried that thought on to South Chute?

I think we should think about avoiding getting caught in an avalanche period. Think consequences for trauma and burial not "this line is going to be so rad".

Given the information the party had standing on top of South Chute, the decision to not ski it, wasn't an obvious one.
-They were not aware of the avalanche danger rating that day since they didn't check UAC.
-They had to ski a similar NW aspect to get from Baldy Shoulder to the base of the Cirque and it's possible they didn't encounter any instabilities there.
-It's also very possible they were not aware of the slide that was remotely triggered in the Cirque. This is still unclear.

So it's possible they could have arrived at the top of South Chute with no witnessed indications of instability in the snowpack.

In my opinion, the only two "musts" they broke that day were not having the appropriate rescue gear and not checking the UAC report. As it turns out the lack of gear was a non-factor and it's impossible to say if it would've turned out differently had they checked UAC and were more aware of the considerable-high rating. I dunno, maybe.

Originally Posted by cmsummit

-They had to ski a similar NW aspect to get from Baldy Shoulder to the base of the Cirque and it's possible they didn't encounter any instabilities there.
-It's also very possible they were not aware of the slide that was remotely triggered in the Cirque. This is still unclear.

I keep coming back to these two items when I think about the chain of events that lead to this accident. As far as them not having gear, I joked the other day about leaving my beacon at home in lieu of my mountain biking body armor. Might have been similar thoughts to what they had.

Originally Posted by cmsummit

Given the information the party had standing on top of South Chute, the decision to not ski it, wasn't an obvious one.
-They were not aware of the avalanche danger rating that day since they didn't check UAC.
-They had to ski a similar NW aspect to get from Baldy Shoulder to the base of the Cirque and it's possible they didn't encounter any instabilities there.
-It's also very possible they were not aware of the slide that was remotely triggered in the Cirque. This is still unclear.

So it's possible they could have arrived at the top of South Chute with no witnessed indications of instability in the snowpack.

In my opinion, the only two "musts" they broke that day were not having the appropriate rescue gear and not checking the UAC report. As it turns out the lack of gear was a non-factor and it's impossible to say if it would've turned out differently had they checked UAC and were more aware of the considerable-high rating. I dunno, maybe.

They knew the danger, they caused a big slide earlier in the day.

check this out-
http://www.powdermag.com/stories/uac...gation-photos/

Originally Posted by Blurred

They knew the danger, they caused a big slide earlier in the day.

check this out-
http://www.powdermag.com/stories/uac...gation-photos/

Yeah, I saw those photos, but it states in the UAC report that- "It's unclear whether they realized they had triggered this large avalanche." Just trying to paint a picture of possibilities.

Originally Posted by Blurred

They knew the danger, they caused a big slide earlier in the day.

check this out-
http://www.powdermag.com/stories/uac...gation-photos/

still not clear as to whether they triggered it and it slid as they were in the area, or if it went after they had passed the ridge and they didn't see it.

Originally Posted by cmsummit

Given the information the party had standing on top of South Chute, the decision to not ski it, wasn't an obvious one.
-They were not aware of the avalanche danger rating that day since they didn't check UAC.
-They had to ski a similar NW aspect to get from Baldy Shoulder to the base of the Cirque and it's possible they didn't encounter any instabilities there.
-It's also very possible they were not aware of the slide that was remotely triggered in the Cirque. This is still unclear.

So it's possible they could have arrived at the top of South Chute with no witnessed indications of instability in the snowpack.

In my opinion, the only two "musts" they broke that day were not having the appropriate rescue gear and not checking the UAC report. As it turns out the lack of gear was a non-factor and it's impossible to say if it would've turned out differently had they checked UAC and were more aware of the considerable-high rating. I dunno, maybe.

While I agree they should have checked the UAC report and had avi gear, I disagree with your assessment that those were the "musts" they did wrong. There are a LOT of clues about instability other than the daily summary report and setting off your own slide. I've been out every day in the past week, and there was nothing surprising at all about the fact that stuff was touchy on Sunday. The surprising thing to me was that people seemed to be ignoring it. I was out meadow skipping in some low angle trees nearby (different part of Alta) on Sunday, and we couldn't skin across a field without hearing whoomphs everywhere. By mid morning there were already several visible (mostly human triggered, but a couple natural) slides in various locations around alta, and a cursory pit dug almost anywhere would have shown you a pretty scary instability on the old rotten snow. Even without the pit, I bet that if you spend a few minutes playing on any of the numerous small steep rolls on the way up to Baldy you could have gotten a representative fracture with very little trouble (we were able to do this easily a mile or two away). Finally, what did they expect slide conditions to be like after 2 feet of snow fall with strong winds on a rotten base layer?

I can see the argument for the more complicated human factor here - the idea that they got away with skiing NW off Baldy, so that was an indication of stability. I still stand by the fact that there were so many other clues surrounding them for the entirety of their tour that it was a gross lack of judgment if they let one successful ski down the side of Baldy overrule the countless other signs of stability. Still, it is worth remembering for our own experiences to try to think holistically and not get a false sense of security when we ski one slope that we believe to be marginal and it doesn't go...

As far as gear is concerned, it certainly doesn't sound like a beacon/probe/shovel would have made a difference in the outcome here (I haven't seen enough medical info here to pass judgement on the first aid preparation, but I do agree with Blurred that a helmet could well have helped, and I too have never seen anything to indicate JP ever wore a helmet). IMO, the absence of avi gear is only *really* important insofar as it is indicative of their general attitude toward avalanche danger that day. But that is just conjecture, since I wasn't up there with them. I had the same thought about trauma vs. burial though, and still was beeping this weekend...

Originally Posted by backcountryben

While I agree they should have checked the UAC report and had avi gear, I disagree with your assessment that those were the "musts" they did wrong. There are a LOT of clues about instability other than the daily summary report and setting off your own slide.

There sure are, but without being out there that day, I can't say for certain what else they should've done. I don't know what they saw, heard, felt, etc. Maybe they witnessed clues of instability and chose to ignore them? I dunno. From where I sit though, those are the only two things that I know for certain they didn't adhere to, that I would've done. I'm not suggesting that's all they should've done. Got it?

When the avalanche occurred on upper Baldy, a few minutes after I talked to Jamie and his friend, I figured they set it off and that they were in it. After screaming avalanche several times and waiting for the slide to stop, my adrenalin was redlined and I went into "what the fuck do I do now" mode. It was silent after the slide and my hands were shaking as I switched my becon from transmit to search. I traversed toward the slide as best I could on my splitboard, but ended up a little below a subridge that separated me from the chute where most of the slide went. A skier came over and he had a better position to view the slide. Neither one of us saw anybody caught by the slide. He was a bit higher up when the slide started and had a better vantage point, and stated for sure nobody was caught up high by it. The face above the chute had a 3 foot fracture and big hangfire just waiting to go. Having convinced ourselves nobody was caught from above (Jamie and his friend), we were unwilling to search the upper part of the slide due to the significant risk of being caught by a second slide (hangfire) in a chute with no escape. The wind was blowing hard and we were exposed, I stated "we need to do a becon search or get the hell out of here." I have people to go home to too. We decide he would ski around to the bottom area of the slide and search, and that I would decend to the bottom and alert Alta patroll. The noise and violence of the avalanche was one of the most terrifying things I have ever experienced and I pray I never experience it again. Did Jamie's party or another party remotely trigger the slide or did wind loading? I do not know. All I know is that a wife is without a husband, childern are without a father, and we are without Jamie. I hope I acted the right way with my incident, I will let the maggs be the judge. You just do not know what you will do in a situation like this until it is staring you in the face. Be safe out there, think about what you are doing and who is waiting for you at home. Having experienced and said all this. See you on the ridgeline on the next pow day---we must all be crazy.

Originally Posted by wasatchcrawler

When the avalanche occurred on upper Baldy, a few minutes after I talked to Jamie and his friend, I figured they set it off and that they were in it. After screaming avalanche several times and waiting for the slide to stop, my adrenalin was redlined and I went into "what the fuck do I do now" mode. It was silent after the slide and my hands were shaking as I switched my becon from transmit to search. I traversed toward the slide as best I could on my splitboard, but ended up a little below a subridge that separated me from the chute where most of the slide went. A skier came over and he had a better position to view the slide. Neither one of us saw anybody caught by the slide. He was a bit higher up when the slide started and had a better vantage point, and stated for sure nobody was caught up high by it. The face above the chute had a 3 foot fracture and big hangfire just waiting to go. Having convinced ourselves nobody was caught from above (Jamie and his friend), we were unwilling to search the upper part of the slide due to the significant risk of being caught by a second slide (hangfire) in a chute with no escape. The wind was blowing hard and we were exposed, I stated "we need to do a becon search or get the hell out of here." I have people to go home to too. We decide he would ski around to the bottom area of the slide and search, and that I would decend to the bottom and alert Alta patroll. The noise and violence of the avalanche was one of the most terrifying things I have ever experienced and I pray I never experience it again. Did Jamie's party or another party remotely trigger the slide or did wind loading? I do not know. All I know is that a wife is without a husband, childern are without a father, and we are without Jamie. I hope I acted the right way with my incident, I will let the maggs be the judge. You just do not know what you will do in a situation like this until it is staring you in the face. Be safe out there, think about what you are doing and who is waiting for you at home. Having experienced and said all this. See you on the ridgeline on the next pow day---we must all be crazy.

It's not your job to to protect anyone but those in your group. You did what you could. Nice work.

Originally Posted by Blurred

I was called out in the RIP Jamie Pierre thread.

It referenced a post I made last year about an avalanche fatality on Torres.

In that thread, I made a blunt statement somewhere along the lines of "victim is dead because of weekend warrior myopic tunnel vision". I had spent every day for the past week or two in the area, and it was very clear to me what the issue was.

I don't think this incident, from what I've read is much different. However, everything I'm going off is what I've read in the report. I have no first hand knowledge of the current snowpack in LCC. From what I've read, shit was ripping left and right all over the canyon, JP and his friend even triggered a big one earlier in the day prior to the slide that killed him.

Good discussion here. I have yet to set foot in the BC this season, but this is a good reminder as to what is at stake. Ive got a 5 month old son now to think about. Without knowing what you just posted, comparing the two incidents and your response to each it seemed like you were being overly harsh on the guy on Torreys vs a popular pro skier. What you posted makes sense to me, you just should have posted your thoughts in a thread such as this vs one his friends/family would easily find. Even more so in my opinion for an average joe skier vs a well known pro. I have to think pro skiers and their families to some extent are held to a higher standard. And they should be better prepared to read negative public comment that may not paint them in the best light.

As far as this incident, If this was a result of head trauma I also wonder if an avy bag would have helped. In particular the snowpulse that wraps around the neck and head. This is why I bought one. Combine that with a helmet and you are almost certainly improving your chances of survival from head/neck/chest trauma. Add that to a shovel in your pack and its some decent protection all around.

Originally Posted by Blurred

I don't know why JP ignored the risks....but isn't that what made him famous in the first place? Doing what others wouldn't even think about doing?
He was rewarded for that type of behavior over and over. He made a life out of it!
The media, ski industry and everyone else condoned his risk taking up until the time it killed him....and now people say what he did was ignorant. Interesting, isn't it?

Great point

Wasatch crawler, I wouldn't sweat your reaction to the situation, first and foremost is keeping yourself safe.

Originally Posted by wasatchcrawler

........[heavy shit]..........

Jesus man....

Thanks.

Originally Posted by Blurred

I don't know why JP ignored the risks....but isn't that what made him famous in the first place? Doing what others wouldn't even think about doing?
He was rewarded for that type of behavior over and over. He made a life out of it!
The media, ski industry and everyone else condoned his risk taking up until the time it killed him....and now people say what he did was ignorant. Interesting, isn't it?

EOT.........

So did Jamie and Party ski North Baldy or West Baldy into Peruvian Gulch?